CONDITIONAL
SENTENCES IN THE
NEW TESTAMENT
by
William
E. Elliott
Submitted in partial
fulfillment of requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Theology in
Grace
Theological Seminary
May 1981
Digitized by Ted Hildebrandt, Gordon
College 2006
Title: CONDITIONAL SENTENCES IN THE GREEK NEW
TESTAMENT
Author: William E. Elliott
Degree: Doctor of Theology
Date: May
1981
Committee:
Dr. Charles R. Smith, Dr. John A. Sproule, Dr. Homer A. Kent, Jr.
Increasing interest in the grammar of
the Greek New Testament
has
focused attention upon aspects of the language that have, for the
most
part, been passed over by past grammarians. Among these topics
is
that of conditional sentences. A superficial survey of the lit-
erature
indicates that most writers seem to have the data confidently
in
tow, but closer inspection shows that this is not the case. Modern
grammarians
are, for the most part, content to follow the lead of A.T.
Robertson
and classify these clauses in terms of First, Second, Third,
and
Fourth Class conditions. Others, dissatisfied with Robertson's
system
and the extension of it by his followers, have returned to the
terminology,
if not the principles of Classical Greek. The situation
is
uncoordinated at best, for even in Classical Greek studies there
is
significant disagreement upon the classification of these sentences.
The historical background to the study
of conditional sentences
is
presented from both the Classical and the Koine Greek standpoints.
Suggested
systems of classification include Time, Fulfillment, Form
and
Determination. The latter, championed by B.L. Gildersleeve, is
the
preferred system. Determination is indicated by the mood of the
verbs
employed in the protasis. Gildersleeve's system entered Koine
studies
primarily through the work of A.T. Robertson. He employes
four
classes into which he places these conditional sentences.
The Simple Condition, using the
indicative mood, states the
condition
as an assumed reality. There is no necessary connection
between
actuality and the statement. This condition merely presents
the
conclusion as a necessary corollary of the condition.
The Contrary to Fact Condition also
uses the indicative mood
to
present the condition as one that is assumed not true, i.e., con-
trary
to fact. Again, there is no necessary connection between
actuality
and the conditional statement.
The Probable Condition presents the
condition as one assumed
probable,
i.e., one that could easily be fulfilled. The hypothetical
nature
of this condition requires the use of the subjunctive mood.
The Possible condition states the
condition as one that is
assumed
possible, i.e., little likelihood of fulfillment. This con-
dition
utilizes the optative mood, and there is no complete example
of
it in the New Testament.
Two basic concepts underlie all
conditional sentences. First,
the
determining factor is the mood of the verb, not the particle em-
ployed.
Second, all conditional sentences state their case as an
assumption,
never as a direct statement of reality.
Accepted by the Faculty of Grace
Theological Seminary
in partial fulfillment of
requirements for the degree
Doctor of Theology
Examining
Committee:
Charles R. Smith
Homer A. Kent Jr.
John A. Sproule
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER
I. A HISTORICAL SURVEY 4
Conditional Sentences in General 4
Conditional Sentences in Classical
Greek 8
The Importance of Classical
Greek 10
Suggested Classification
Systems 10
Classification According
to Time 11
Classification
According to Fulfillment 18
Classification
According to Form 20
Classification
According to Determination 23
Conditional Sentences in Koine Greek 33
Early Grammarians 34
George Benedict
Winer 34
Alexander Buttmann 37
Samuel G. Green 40
Ernest DeWitt
Burton 42
James Hope Moulton 46
Modern Grammarians 49
Archibald Thomas
Robertson 49
William Douglas
Chamberlain 55
Charles Francis
Digby Moule 57
Friedrich Blass -
Albert Debrunner 60
Nigel Turner 62
H. E. Dana and
Julius R. Mantey 65
Robert W. Funk 67
William Sanford La
Sor 65
Summary of Koine Grammarians 71
II. THE SIMPLE CONDITION 73
Introduction 73
The Conditional Particle ei
75
The Significance of ei 75
The Significance of ei
with other Particles 77
The Negative Particles in Simple
Conditions 81
Ean with the
Indicative Mood 84
Significance of Moods and Tenses 88
i
ii
Meaning of the Simple Condition 95
Particular and General
Conditions 95
Degree of Reality 98
Translation of the Simple Condition 105
III. THE CONTRARY TO FACT CONDITION 106
Introduction 106
Significance of Tense 110
Imperfect Tense 110
Aorist Tense 113
Pluperfect Tense 115
The Use of An
in Contrary to Fact Conditions 116
The Meaning of the Contrary to Fact
Condition 121
The Translation of the Contrary to
Fact Condition 123
IV. THE PROBABLE CONDITION 129
Introduction 129
Analysis of the Probable Condition 131
The Protasis 131
The Apodosis 141
Meaning of the Probable Condition 148
Review of the Grammarians 148
Evaluation of the
Grammarians 151
Relationship with the Simple
Condition 156
Summary 163
Translation of the Probable Condition 165
V. THE POSSIBLE CONDITION 169
Introduction 169
The Optative Mood in General 170
The Optative Mood in Conditional
Sentences 174
The Construction 175
The Significance 178
The Grammarians 178
The Specific Examples 180
Those with the
Protasis Implied 180
Those with the
Protasis Stated 184
Translation of the Possible Condition 191
VI. CONCLUSION 193
Simple
Conditions 194
Unreal
Conditions 195
Probable Conditions 195
Possible Conditions 196
Summary 196
iii
APPENDICES 198
Appendix I: Occurrences of the Simple
Condition 198
Appendix II: Occurrences of the Unreal
Condition 211
Appendix III: Occurrences of the
Probable Condition 215
BIBLIOGRAPHY
226
INTRODUCTION
God created man with the potential for abstract reasoning,
and
his many languages
reflect this through their use of the subjunctive
mood: the mood of
contingency or possibility. Posing questions,
exploring possibilities
and analyzing logical connections are part of
man's reasoning
capabilities, and his languages reflect these skills.
Among the syntactical
tools which accomplish these are conditional
sentences. These
sentences, usually consisting of two clauses,
state a hypothesis and
give a conclusion. In English this corres-
ponds to the "If .
. . then" formula.
This type of sentence, while prevalent in English, is
usually
listed as one of
several subordinate clause relationships.1 By
contrast, the Greek
language presents a more fully developed system
of conditional
sentences by means of which a remarkable degree of
precision may be
obtained in expressing conditional thought. The
Greek conditional
sentence presents both the condition and certain
specific implications
about it in one sentence whereas English needs
both the conditional
statement and qualifying sentences to communicate
the same concept. This
compactness lends itself to greater precision
1 Porter Perrin and George
H. Smith, Handbook of Current
English, third edition,
edited by Jim W. Corder (
Scott, Foresman and
Company, 1968), 48-56, 120-121.
2
in the statement of
conditional concepts.
Since conditional sentences are basic to the material of
the
Greek New Testament, a
detailed understanding of conditional sentences
is vital for an
accurate interpretation of its contents. This, then,
is the goal of this
study: to explore conditional sentences so that the
message of the New
Testament may be better understood.
Though all students of Greek, both Classical and Koine,
agree
on the importance of
conditional sentences, few agree on the analysis
of them. A. T.
Robertson aptly describes the situation in Koine studies
when he writes,
"In truth the doctors have disagreed themselves and the
rest have not known how
to go."1 The Classical scene is likewise
muddled, as
Blass-Debrunner notes, "The classical grammars are also hope-
lessly at
variance."2
Some of this confusion is due to the absence of a standard
by
which to classify
conditional sentences. Time, degree of reality and
construction have all
been suggested by various grammarians as possible
classification systems.
Further, each grammarian seems to have developed
his own terminology in
discussing the subject, and each argues that his
is best. Indeed, it is
possible to trace the influence of major
grammarians through
succeeding generations by noting who adopts their
terminology in dealing
with conditional sentences.
1 A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the
Light of
Historical Research
(
1934),
p. 1004.
2 Friedrich Blass and
Alvert Debrunner, A Greek Grammar of the
New Testament
and Other Early Christian Literature, translated and
revised
by Robert W. Funk (
1961), p. 189.
3
Another reason for the lack of standardization may be the
inherent flexibility of
the language itself. Though Classical and Koine
Greek may be considered
fossilized ancestors of Modern Greek, they were
living, functioning
languages, complete with the internal syntactical
elasticity found in
living languages today. Greek, like English, developed
through usage, and
patterns so developed may refuse to be forced into a
logically consistent
mold. So, whether through lack of a standard, or
lack of accepted
terminology, or through syntactical flexibility,
conditional sentences
have provided grammarians with a fruitful area of
contemplation, and
students with a frustrating area of concentration.
This study seeks to offer help to those involved in the
analysis of conditional
sentences by summarizing the work of previous
grammarians and giving
a detailed analysis of each type of conditional
sentence in the New
Testament. The work of past and contemporary
scholars will be
surveyed to give an overview of their studies, agree-
ments, and
disagreements. Then the conditional sentences in the Greek
New Testament will be
identified and analyzed with the help of principles
obtained from the
grammatical survey. Finally, observations will be
offered on the
important matters of translation and interpretation.
The result should be a
small but positive step in gaining further insight
into the meaning of
conditional sentences in the Greek New Testament.
CHAPTER I
A HISTORICAL SURVEY
Since any study necessarily builds upon the work of others,
a
survey of previous
studies of conditional sentences is basic to a
thorough understanding
of the topic. This study will include the work
of both Classical and
Koine scholars.
Conditional
Sentences in General
A brief survey of the technical details of conditional
sentences
will set the scene for
the succeeding discussion and evaluation.
The Definition of
Conditional Sentences
A conditional sentence is a two-clause sentence in which
the
first clause states a
supposition or hypothesis and the second clause
states the results if
that condition is met. The hypothetical clause
which states the
condition ("If this . . .") is termed the protasis
and the conclusion
clause is called the apodosis
(". . . then this.").
Herbert Weir Smyth
explains it this way:
A condition is a supposition on which
a statement is based.
A
conditional sentence commonly consists of two clauses:
The protasis: the conditional, or
subordinate, clause,
expressing
a supposed or assumed case (if).
The apodosis: the conclusion, or
principal, clause, expressing
what
follows if the condition is realized. The truth or fulfillment
of
the conclusion depends on the truth or fulfillment of the
conditional clause.1
1 Herbert Weir Smyth, Greek Grammar for Colleges (
American Book Company,
1920), p. 512.
5
The Construction of Conditional
Sentences
The Protasis
As Smyth stated, the protasis stands as the subordinate or
dependent clause,
setting forth the condition. The term protasis comes
from prosta<sij,
"lit. stretching forward, that which
is put forward
(in logic, a premise).1 While the formal sequence is the standard
"If . . .
then," English, as well as Greek, varies the sequence in
usage: "You will
receive the reward if you do a good job."
The form of the protasis in Greek involves a conditional
particle (ei] or e]a<n) and a verb.
The various combinations of particles
and verbs will be
discussed later. Though the mood of the verb is the
key element in
identifying the type of condition, certain constructions
are fairly standard.
Again, these will be presented later. This
combination of
particles and moods enables Greek to express conditional
thought with a compact
precision lacking in English. The thought of
a few Greek words may
take a few English sentences to be communicated.
The Apodosis
The main or independent clause in a conditional sentence is
termed the apodosis.
This term comes from "a]podo<sij,
lit. giving back,
return;
i. e.
the resuming or answering clause."2 The apodosis may
employ verbs in any
tense or mood, and frequently, in the Koine at
1 Smyth, Grammar, p. 512.
2 Ibid.,
p. 512.
6
least, uses the
particle a@n
with moods other than the indicative.1 Taken
together, then, the protasis
and apodosis constitute a conditional
sentence.
The Conditional
Particles
The origin of the Greek conditional particles is as obscure
as
their usage is
important. Goodwin, one of the leading Classical Greek
grammarians, succinctly
states:
It is impossible to discuss
intelligently the origin of the
conditional sentence until the etymology
and original meaning of
the particles ei], a@n, and ke< are determined.
On these questions
we have as yet little or no real
knowledge.2
He then gives a brief
summary of what is known about these particles
and concludes:
But here we are on purely theoretical
ground; and we must content
ourselves practically with the fact, that
in the earliest Greek
known
to us ei was fully established in its
conditional sense,
like our if and Latin si.3
1 H. E. Dana and Julius R.
Mantey, A Manual Grammar of the
Greek New Testament (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1966), p. 288.
2 William Watson Goodwin, Syntax of the Mood and Tenses of the
Greek Verb (Boston: Ginn &
Company, 1893), p. 142.
3 Ibid.,
p. 143.
7
ei]
Liddell and Scott trace the origin of ei] back to its use in
Homer where it is
sometimes replaced by the Doric ai].1 It introduces
either conditional
clauses or questions and is regularly used with the
indicative mood.2 Its consistent translation in conditional
clauses is
"if." The
relationship of this particle, the indicative mood and the
assumed reality of the
condition will be discussed later.
e]a<n
Ean
is a combination of ei
and an, according to Dana and
Mantey.3 Smyth remarks that "The etymology of e]a<n is uncertain:
either from h] + a@n or from ei] + a@n.”4 This particle introduces
conditions in the
subjunctive mood, though it is not limited to this
mood:
The difference between ei]
and e]a<n has been considerably lessened
in Hellenistic as compared with earlier
Greek. We have seen that
e]a<n can even take
the indicative; while (as rarely in classical
Greek) ei] can be found with the subjunctive.5
1 Henry George Liddell and
Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon,
Vol.
I, edited by Henry Stuart Jones and Roderick McKenzie (
At
the Clarendon Press, 1951), p. 480. See also William Watson
Goodwin,
An Elementary Greek Grammar (Boston:
Ginn Brothers, 1872),
p.
263.
2 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 246.
3 Ibid., p. 245.
4 Smyth, Grammar, p. 512.
5 J. H. Moulton, A Grammar of New Testament Greek, Volume
I:
Prolegomena, third edition
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908), p. 187.
8
This caution should
guard against absolute rules, but the general
principle is that e]a<n utilizes the
subjunctive mood while ei]
employs
the indicative. Again,
the specific implications of this regarding the
assumed reality of the
condition will be discussed later.
These conditional particles are similar to particles of
interjection in Homeric
Greek and related languages. N. D. Coleman
suggests that the
conditional particles "appear to have been inter-
jections in the first
place."1 J. B. Greenough
tries to push the
origin of the
conditional sentence and its attendant particles back into
the frontiers of the
Indo-European linguistic heritage: "We are
naturally led to
conclude that this [conditional] construction was in
use more or less in
Indo-European times and was received by each of the
languages as a part of
the original inheritance."2 Whatever the source
of these particles,
conditional sentences were a vital part of the
language of both
Classical and Koine Greek and play a vital role in the
Greek New Testament.
Conditional Sentences
in Classical Greek
Prior to the discovery of the papyri and the comprehension
of
their linguistic
significance, Biblical Greek was considered to be
1 N. D. Coleman, "Some
Noteworthy Uses of ei] in Hellenistic
Greek
with a Note on St. Mark viii 12," The
Journal of Theological
Studies, 27:1 (April,
1976), p. 159.
2 James B. Greenough,
"On Some Forms of Conditional Sentences
in
Latin, Greek and Sanskrit," Transactions
of the American Philo-
logical
Association, 2:2 (June, 1871), p. 164.
9
a unique species of
that language, sometimes referred to as "Holy Ghost
Greek."1
This was, of course, a false position,
for the Greek of the
New Testament was
simply the language of the common man as found in
"the street and
market place."2 This was
distinguished from Hellenistic
Greek, a direct
descendant of Attic or Classical Greek. While some
New Testament writings
show distinct Hellenistic influence, such as
Luke, Acts and Hebrews,
others are distinctly Koine. This is not
because the writers,
according to Moulton, used Greek "as foreigners,
Aramaic thought
underlying Greek expression."3 Rather it is due to
the individual writers
using the language closest to them, each reflecting
their own blend of
Hebrew and Hellenistic cultures. As the result of
pioneering efforts by
men like Adolf Deismann in analyzing the papyri,
"Biblical"
Greek became identified as the language of the common man,
the Koine Greek. To be
sure, it still reflected the Hebrew idiom of
the authors, but it was
Koine none the less. A. T. Robertson sums up
the current
understanding of New Testament Greek:
The Greek of the New Testament that
was used with practical
uniformity over most of the Roman world
is called the Common Greek
or koinh<. Not that it was not good Greek, but rather the
Greek
in common use. There was indeed a
literary koinh< [Hellenistic
Greek] and a vernacular koinh<. Plutarch is
a good specimen of the,
literary koinh< while the
papyri are chiefly in the vernacular koinh<
like most of the New Testament.4
1 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, pp. 9-15.
2 W. White, Jr.,
"Greek Language," The Zondervan
Pictorial
Encyclopedia of
the Bible,
5 vols., Merrill C. Tenney, editor (Grand
Rapids:
Zondervan Publishing House, 1977), II, pp. 827-828.
3 Moulton, Prolegomena, p. 3.
4 A. T. Robertson, A Short Grammar of the Greek New Testament
(New York: A. C.
Armstrong E. Son, 1908), p. 6.
10
The Importance of
Classical Greek
If the Koine of the New Testament is in the mainstream of
linguistic development
and expression, does it have any significant
connection with the
literary history of the language as a whole, and
with Classical Greek
specifically? Yes, answers Robertson:
This
koinh< was itself the heir of the past. The various Greek
dialects blended on an Attic base. The koinh< was thus richer in
expression as to words and forms than
any of the older dialects.
Compare the relation of modern English to
the various tongues that
have contributed to its power and
expansion. Ionic, Doric, Aeolic,
North West Greek and other dialects have made
some contribution to
the common result. The use of nominatives
in the midst of accusa-
tives in the Boeotian, for instance, is
strangely like the Book of
Revelation. So the absence of the future
participle is like the N.T.1
This heritage, then, is sufficient justification for
beginning
the study of
conditional sentences in Classical Greek, the language
of the period from
Homer to the Alexandrian conquests (c. 330 B.C.).2
This language
constituted the "chief basis of New Testament Greek,"3
thus its handling of
conditional sentences has important effects on
the Koine Greek.
Suggested
Classification Systems
How, then, did Classical Greek scholars classify
conditional
sentences? In general,
they seemed to follow one of three systems.
C. D. Chambers outlines
them as follows:
1 A. T. Robertson, A Short
Grammar, p. 6.
2 Dana and Mantey, Grammar,
p. 6.
3 Ibid., p. 6.
11
There are three possible ways of
classifying conditional
sentences, viz. (i) by time, (ii) by
fulfillment, (iii) by form.
The first is the system of Prof. Goodwin,
the second is proposed by
Mr. Donovan . . . and the third that of
Mr. Sonnenschein.l
Though the situation is
not as absolute as Chambers suggests, his
comments serve as a
useful guide to the discussion of conditional
sentences in Classical
Greek.
Classification
According to Time
The classification most familiar to American students of
Classical Greek is that
of William Watson Goodwin. As Professor of
Greek Literature at
ficant influence on
Greek studies in the
book, Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek
Verb, was published in
1860 when he was
twenty-nine years of age. Ten years later he published
An
Elementary Greek. Grammar.2 The importance of these works may be
judged by the fact that
both are still in print. His influence
extended into New
Testament studies through the work of Ernest DeWitt
The statement of the system.--Goodwin sets forth his
system in
terms of past, present
and future conditions:
1 C. D. Chambers, "The
Classification of Conditional Sentences,"
The Classical
Review,
9:2 (May, 1895), pp. 293-294.
2 Chalmers G. Davidson,
"Goodwin, William Watson," Dictionary
American Biography, Vol. IV,
edited by Allen Johnson (
Scribner's Sons, 1957),
pp. 411-413.
12
The most obvious natural distinction
is that of (a) present
and past conditions and
(b) future conditions. Present and
past
conditions (a) are divided into two
classes by distinguishing (1)
those which imply nothing as to the
fulfillment of the condition
from (2) those which imply that the
condition is not or was not
fulfilled. Future conditions (b) have two
classes (1, 2), distin-
guished by the manner in which the
supposition is stated. Class 1
of present and past conditions is further
distinguished on the
ground of the particular or general
character of the supposi-
tion . . . .1
Goodwin also includes the concepts of (a) fulfillment or
non-
fulfillment and (b)
particular and general characteristics as other
features by which
conditional sentences may be classified. The first
leads him to identify
conditional clauses as (1) those which imply
nothing as to the
fulfillment of the condition, (2) those which imply
fulfillment of the
condition and (3) those which imply the nonfulfillment
of the condition.
He explains the particular and general characteristics:
A particular supposition refers to a
definite act or to several
definite acts, supposed to occur at some
definite time (or
times) . . . .
A general supposition refers
indefinitely to any act or acts
of a given class which may be supposed to
occur or to have
occurred at any time . . . .2
The form of the conditional sentence may serve as a guide
to
its identification and
classification under these headings. A later
edition of his grammar
summarizes this:
I. Present and past suppositions implying nothing as to
ful-
fillment or
condition:
(a) Chiefly particular:
(protasis)
ei] with indicative
(apodosis)
any form of the verb
1 Goodwin, Syntax of Moods, p. 139.
2 Ibid.,
p. 141.
13
(b) General:
1. (protasis)
e]a<n with subjunctive
(apodosis) present indicative
2. (protasis)
ei] with
the optative
(apodosis) imperfect indicative
II. Present and Past suppositions implying that
the condition is
not fulfilled:
(protasis)
ei]
with past tense of indicative
(apodosis) past
tense of indicative with a@n
III. Future
suppositions in more vivid form:
(protasis)
ei]
with subjunctive (sometimes ei] with future
indicative
(apodosis) any
future form
IV. Future suppositions in less vivid form:
(protasis)
ei]
with optative
(apodosis)
optative with a@n1
Smyth also adopts this
system of classification.2
The evaluation of the system.--The first point in
evaluating
Goodwin's system is
that of time. He seems to make time a basis of
classification when
absolute time is of secondary importance in the
Greek verb system.
Goodwin himself notes that relative time is far more
prominent in Greek
verbs than in English: "It is a special distinction
between the Greek and
the English idioms, that the Greek uses its verbal
1 William Watson Goodwin, Greek Grammar, revised by Charles
2 Smyth, Grammar,
pp. 513-516.
14
forms much more freely
to denote merely relative time."1 A. T. Robertson,
noting that absolute
time is limited to the indicative mood, warns that
"even in the
indicative the time element is subordinate to the kind of
action expressed."2
While his reference to "kind"
of action may be
questioned, his
observation on time is helpful.
But is Goodwin basing his classification on time as
indicated
by the verb itself, or
on absolute time as indicated by the sentence as
a whole? The examples
he offers as illustrations seem to place the
emphasis upon the verb
rather than the syntax. Thus he presents: "Ei]
pra<ssei
tou?to, kalw?j e@xei, if
he is doing this, it is well; ei] pra<ssei
tou?to,
h[marthke<n, if he is doing
this, he has erred; ei]
pra<ssei tou?to,
kalw?j
e@cei, if he is doing
this, it will be well."3 One may well argue
that the syntax of a
verb does assign it absolute time in any given
context. But Goodwin
does not stress the role of syntax in establishing
the time of his verb.
One must therefore question any system of
classification which
makes absolute time as found in the verb itself a
foundation criterion.
Second, his distinction between particular and general
conditions
may be questioned as an
objective standard of classification. Goodwin
argues that
1 Goodwin, Syntax of Moods, p. 8.
2 A. T. Robertson, Grammar, p. 825.
3 Goodwin, Syntax
of Moods, p. 139.
15
When the apodosis has a verb of
present time expressing a
customary or repeated action, the
protasis may refer (in a general
way) to any act or acts of a given class
which may be supposed to
occur at any time within the period
represented in English as
present. Thus we may say:--
Ea@n
ti<j kle<pth, kola<zetai, if (ever) any one steals, he is
(in
all such cases) punished . . . .1
Goodwin's concept of a present general condition seems to
fit
conditional sentences
in the New Testament, such as I John 1:7: e]a<n
de>
e]n
t&? fwti> peripatw?men. . . , koinwni<an e@xomen -
but if (whenever) we
walk in the light . . .
we have (in such cases) fellowship. But what
about conditions such
as Luke 5:12? Here the apodosis uses a present
tense, but the
condition must be considered a particular one, limited
to the historical
situation: ku<rie, e]a<n qe<lhj, du<nasai<
me kaqari<sai -
Lord, if you are
willing you are able to cleanse me.
What is the difference between these two sentences? Simply
that the apodosis of I
John 1:7 contains a present tense verb which
expresses a
"customary or repeated action," while that of Luke 5:12
does not. There can be
no question that the condition in I John 1:7
states a general
situation that is presently true for all believers,
but such identification
depends upon the interpretation of the action
represented by the
verb. Could it be possible for interpreters to
disagree over the
interpretation of a given verb? Yes, it could.
Should the basis of
classification be a point that is interpretative
in nature? It seems
reasonable to answer in the negative. Since, then,
there is no objective
way of determining if a verb is referring to a
1 Goodwin, Syntax
Mood's, p. 141.
16
general or a particular
act, the final determination becomes one of
interpretation rather
than form. The concept of general versus particular
may serve as an
interpretative guideline, but it is not distinguished by
form. "That point
[of present or general conditions]," writes A. T.
Robertson ,"has no
bearing on the quality of the condition."1 Though
several modern New
Testament grammarians continue this terminology,
it must be questioned
as a criterion to the objective analysis of
conditional sentences.
Another point to consider in evaluating Goodwin's
classifica-
tion system is his
concept of fulfillment or non-fulfillment as found
in the condition.
Robertson has particular problems with Goodwin's
concept that conditions
employing the indicative mood in the protasis
imply nothing as to the
fulfillment of the condition. This, as
Robertson sees it,
violates the very nature of the indicative mood:
The words to which I object, besides
"particular," are "implying
nothing as to the fulfillment of the
condition." This condition
pointedly
implies the fulfillment of the condition. It is the
condition of actuality, reality, Wirklichkeit, and not mere
"possibility" as Farrar has it
. . . a la Goodwin.2
Robertson claims that
Goodwin "confuses the 'fact' with the 'statement'
of the fact."3
This seems a bit harsh, for Goodwin himself writes:
"The Greek has no
form implying that a condition is or was fulfilled,
and it is hardly
conceivable that any language should find such a form
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1006.
2 Ibid., p. 1006.
3 Ibid.,p.
1006.
17
necessary or
useful."1 This would
amount to a direct statement, for
if the condition is
fulfilled, then the results are realized. Such a
statement would not be
a conditional statement at all, but a statement
of actuality. While the
specific topic of reality in conditional
sentences will be
examined in detail later, the important point is that
Robertson had serious
doubts about the validity of Goodwin's classifica-
tion scheme.
Another minor point of criticism leveled against Goodwin is
that of terminology. J.
W. Roberts notes that "Others have attacked
Goodwin's terms 'more'
and 'less vivid' as describing the significance
of his third and fourth
class conditional sentences," but gives no
supporting references.2
Robertson did not use this terminology,
and
those who followed have
also set it aside. Some contemporary grammarians,
though, are returning
to it. Both Robert W. Funk and William S.
La Sor speak of
"vivid" and "less vivid" concepts when discussing
conditional sentences
in their grammars. This point is not foundational
to the analysis of
Goodwin's system, and will be discussed later.
1 Goodwin, Syntax of Moods, p. 140.
2 J. W. Roberts, "The
Use of Conditional Sentences in the Greek
New
Testament as Compared with Homeric, Classical and Hellenistic
Uses,"
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, the
1955,
p. 20.
3 Robert W. Funk, A Beginning-Intermediate Grammar of Hellenistic
Greek (Missoula,
Montana: The Society of Biblical Literature, 1973),
p.
684; and William Sanford La Sor, Handbook
of New Testament Greek,
vol.
II (Grand. Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1973),
pp. 221-225.
18
In summary, then, Goodwin is the main proponent of
Chamber's
first suggested
criterion for classifying conditional sentences: Time.
The main point of
Goodwin's system is the classification of these
sentences into past, present
and future conditions. Some of these
categories are further
divided into "particular" and "general" condi-
tions, and some of
these are subdivided by "vividness."
Criticism of his system has focused on (1) his use of time
as
a main dividing point,
(2) the characteristics of particular and
general, (3) the
implication of fulfillment and (4) his terminology.
The majority of Koine
grammarians today, operating under the influence
of A. T. Robertson, do
not follow Goodwin's system, though some show
signs of returning to
it.
Classification
According to Fulfillment
The second criterion suggested by Chambers for classifying
conditional sentences
is that of fulfillment, i.e. cataloging them
according to the
fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the condition.
The statement of the system.--Herbert Wier Smyth
follows this
system, noting that
conditional sentences may be classified according
to form and function.
Among the functions he lists is "fulfillment or
non-fulfillment."1
J. Donovan also champions this method of
classifica-
tion, and his argument
is worth pursuing. He uses a book review essay
as an opportunity to
argue his case in The Classical Review.
The grammar
1 Smyth, Grammar,
p. 514.
19
he is reviewing argues
for the position of classification by form, and
Donovan rejects this
approach. He argues that different meanings may
have the same form. He
concludes by writing: "What is wanted is not that
there should be a
search for 'would be' or 'should be' or 'might be'
or other variations;
but recourse should at once be had to the universal
canon of fulfillment or
non-fulfillment."1
Further, recognizing that his position had already been
challenged, he adds a
note of defense:
After the campaign recently conducted in
the pages of this Review
against the very principle of fulfillment
as a basis of classifica-
tion, one point is now clear, if it was
not so already, namely,
that to be regarded as unfulfilled, a
condition need not necessarily
be so actually,
but that it is enough that it should be assumed
to be such.2
Thus Donovan elevates
the concept of fulfillment or non-fulfillment to
the status of a
"universal canon" for the classification of conditional
sentences.
The evaluation of the system.--Donovan's review
brought a rapid
response from Chambers
who defended the position in question. His
rebuttal begins with a
summary of Donovan's principle:
Therefore the universal canon resolves
itself into this: Conditions
are to be divided into (i) those which
imply or assume without
implying that the condition is not
fulfilled, and (ii) those which
do not assume or imply that the condition
is not fulfilled.3
1 J. Donovan,
"Sonnenschein's Greek Grammar," The
Classical
Review, 9:1 (January,
1895), p. 64.
2 Ibid., p. 64.
3 Chambers, "Classification," pp.
293-294.
20
He then offers three
serious objections to Donovan's position. First,
Chambers observes that
this produces an imbalance in grammar. Condi-
tions implying
non-fulfillment are relatively rare in the language and
should not be the basis
of classification. Second, the terminology is
awkward at best and
hardly fits the need of the beginning composition.
Since Chambers is
speaking of English to Greek composition, his comment
has little reference to
this study. Third, and more to the point,
Donovan's scheme does
not fit all cases. The majority of grammarians
have not followed his
suggestions. The concept of fulfillment does, as
Goodwin notes, play a
role in our understanding of conditional sentences,
but it does not provide
a sufficiently applicable standard upon which to
classify them.1
Classification by Form
The third criterion Chambers suggests is classification by
the
form of the conditional
sentence. Among the classical grammarians who
have followed this
approach is E. A. Sonnenschein, professor of Greek
and Latin at
The statement of the system.--Sonnenschein writes:
To me the ordinary forms of
Conditional Sentences, whether in
Latin, Greek or a modern language,
present themselves in two great
1 Goodwin, Syntax of Moods, p. 139.
2 S. B. Sedwick,
"Sonnenschein, Edward Adolf," Dictionary
of
National Biography, 1922-1930, edited by J. R. H. Weaver (
21
classes, the distinction between which is
marked by certain well-
defined differences both of meaning and of
linguistic form.1
Form, for him, helps
determine the meaning, for in his classification
"there is a coincidence between distinctions of form
and distinctions of
meaning."2
Chambers supports this principle, noting that "It is
axiomatic that the
division by form, and not by sense, is the truly
scientific one, because
like forms must (originally at least) have like
meanings, but like
meanings need not have like forms."3
Smyth notes that several possibilities exist with regard to
classification
according to form:
Classified according to form, all
conditional sentences may be
arranged with regard to the form of
the protasis or of the apodosis.
Protasis: ei] with the
indicative.
e]a<n (rarely ei]) with the
subjunctive.
ei]
with the optative.
Apodosis: with a@n, denoting
what would (should) be or have been.
without a@n,
not denoting what would (should) be
or
have been.4
Which of these possibilities should be followed if
conditional
sentences are to be
classified by form? "Ought we to classify according
to the Protasis
(Subordinate Clause) or according to the Apodosis
1 E. A. Sonnenschein,
"Horton-Smith's Conditional
Sentences,"
The Classical.
Review,
9:2 (April, 1895), p. 221.
2 Ibid., p. 221, italics added .
3 Chambers,
"Classification," p. 294.
4 Smyth, Grammar,
p. 513.
22
(Principal Clause), or
according to both at once?"1 Sonnenschein opts
for the Apodosis as the
standard. Roberts outlines his system so:
I.
Type One: Sentences without a@n in the
apodosis: the protasis
expressing no implication of
fulfillment.
ei] with a Past
Indicative expressing what was
ei] with a Present
Indicative expressing what is
e]a<n with a
Subjunctive expressing what is or what will be
Also e]a<n
h] – e@stai "If A is B," followed by a command or
wish.
II. Type Two: Sentences with ay in the apodosis:
the protasis
expressing some sort of implication as
to fact or fulfill-
ment.
ei] with the
Optative--Optative with a@n expressing what would be
ei] with a Past
Indicative--Past Indicative with a@n expressing
what would be
III. Type Three: ei] ei@h
. . . e@stai
(or e@sti) expressing in the
protasis some sort of mental reservation.2
Evaluation of the system.--Donovan, as indicated
above, claims
that this system leads
to more problems than solutions in application.
Even Chambers wonders
"whether this was the original principle of
division, or only its
accidental final result."3 The basic problem is
the occasional
divergence between form and meaning. Although the use of
form does offer an
objective standard of classification, is it reasonable
to pursue it when it
does not coincide with the real world? As will be shown
Sonnenschein is on the
right track, but the emphasis requires a slight
1 Sonnenschein,
"Horton-Smith," p. 220.
2 Roberts,
"Conditional Sentences," p. 12.
3 Charmers, "Classification," p. 294.
23
shift in order to be
workable.
Classification by
Determination
Chambers omitted a fourth basis of classification of
conditional
sentences, that of
determination. This approach, popularized by B. L.
Gildersleeve and
followed by many other grammarians, was first published
in 1876 and again in
1882.1 It seems strange that
Chambers, writing in
1895, was unaware of
it.
The statement of the system.--Gildersleeve states
his case so:
In common with most grammarians, I
divide the conditional
sentences into four classes, for which I
have been in the habit of
using the designations
"Logical," "Anticipatory," "Ideal,"
"Unreal." If nothing more can be
said in behalf of this nomenclature
than that it saves time, something at
least has been said; and I am
glad to learn that a part of this
nomenclature, as applied to the
Latin language, has found favor among
teachers. Logical, Ideal, and
Unreal conditions occur in Latin also. The
Anticipatory is
peculiar to Greek.2
He describes the Logical Condition as one that
. . . states the elements in question. It
is used of that which
can be brought to the standard of fact; but
that standard may be
for or against the truth of the postulate.
All that the logical
condition asserts is the inexorable
connexion [sic] of the two
members of the sentence.3
1 B. L. Gildersleeve,
"On ei] with the Future Indicative and ean
with
the Subjunctive in the Tragic Poets," Transactions
of the American
Philological
Association,
7:1 (January, 1876), pp. 2-23; and “Pindaric
Syntax,”
pp. 434-445.
2 Gildersleeve, "On ei],"
pp. 5-6.
. 3 Gildersleeve,
"Pindar," p. 435.
24
This type of condition
corresponds to Robertson's First Class condition.1
The Anticipatory Condition involves e]a<n in the
protasis, and thus
corresponds to
Robertson's Third Class condition. Interestingly enough,
Gildersleeve agrees
with Goodwin in his concept of particular and
general
("generic"), noting that "The anticipatory condition is
particular or generic
according to the character of the apodosis . . .,
just as any other
conditional sentence."2 The
key element is the
use of the present
indicative in the apodosis. Such a condition "is
regularly generic."3
Gildersleeve's Ideal Condition employs the optative mood
and
"seems to have
been developed out of the wish, just as the anticipatory
was developed out of
demand."4 This corresponds to Robertson's Fourth
Class condition. Since
the New Testament has no complete sentence of
this type, his comments
on it are beside the point of this study.
His fourth type of condition is termed the Unreal
Condition,
corresponding to
Robertson's Second Class condition. Rather than use
the term
non-fulfillment as does Goodwin, he speaks of it as
"futureless."
The Unreal. Condition, 'the hypothesis
contrary to fact,' seems
to be related to the hopeless wish, as
the ideal condition to the
wish pure and simple . . . . A wish may
be madly impossible, but
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1007.
2 Gildersleeve,
"Pindar," p. 436.
3 Ibid., p. 435.
4 Ibid.,
p. 436.
25
if it belongs to the domain of the future
it is optative. Now the
hopeless wish is hopeless because it is
futureless . . . .1
In simple language,
this condition states a condition as though there
is no hope whatsoever
of its being fulfilled. It implies its non-
fulfillment.
Thus Gildersleeve divides conditional sentences into two
broad
catagories: the first
containing those which imply something about the
determination of the
condition, and the second containing those which
imply nothing about its
determination. The first catagory is subdivided
into two classes: those
which imply positive fulfillment of the condi-
tion and those which
imply negative or non-fulfillment of the condition.
The second catagory
also is subdivided into two classes: those
conditions with a
greater degree of probability and those with a
lesser degree of
probability.
Roberts summarizes this
in outline form:
I. Condition determined
A. As
fulfilled - the Simple or Logical Condition
past
Protasis: ei]
with an indicative present
future
Apodosis: Any form of verb
B. As
unfulfilled - the Unreal Condition
Protasis: ei]
with a past indicative
Apodosis: Past indicative with a@n
1 Gildersleeve, "Pindar," p. 437.
26
II. Condition undetermined
A. With greater prospect of
fulfillment - The Anticipatory
Condition
Protasis: e]a<n
with the subjunctive
Apodosis:
Usually future, except for the general, which has
the present indicative
B. With less prospect of fulfillment - The Ideal Condition
Protasis: ei]
with the optative
Apodosis: Optative with a@n1
The comparison of the system.--A comparison of this
outline with
that of Goodwin's
system on pages 12-13 or with the chart in Smyth's
grammar will indicate
Gildersleeve's points of departure.2
These may
be listed as:
1. No attempt is made to utilize the time of the condition
as a
guide to the
classification of the sentence.
2. No attempt has been made to divide them into particular
or general on the basis
of the protasis. Each of these may, in
Gildersleeve's opinion,
be particular or general, depending on the
apodosis, but that is
not a basis of classification.3
3. Mood, rather than tense is emphasized as one of the
important
features of the
protasis.
1 Roberts,
"Conditional Sentences," p. 22.
2 Smyth, Gammar, p. 516.
3 He does approve of such a
distinction as a guide to interpre-
tation.
See "On ei]," p. 7.
27
4. No attempt is made to distinguish general and particular
conditions by form,
though he does recognize that the Anticipatory
condition (e]a<n with the
subjunctive in the protasis) is more often than
not a general
condition.
5. The Future Condition (called by Smyth the "Future
Emotional"1)
is identified as a
simple or logical condition on the basis of the
indicative mood.
This system has been followed by a significant number of
Koine
grammarians, including
men such as Winer,2 Buttman,3 Robertson,4 and
Blass-Debrunner.5
The evaluation of the system.--There are three
points which need
to be considered in
evaluating his system. First, the above-mentioned
1 Smyth, Grammar, p. 516.
2 G[eorge] Benedict] Winer,
A Grammar of the Idiom of the New
Testament, seventh
edition, revised by Gottlieb Lunemann, translated
and
edited by J. H. Thayer (
Publisher,
1893), p. 291.
3 Alexander Buttmann, A Grammar of the New Testament Greek,
translated
and edited by J. H. Thayer (
Publisher,
1873), p. 220.
4 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1004.
5 F[riedrich] Blass and
Albert] Debrunner, A Greek Grammar of
the New Testament
and Other Early Christian Literature, translated and
revised
by Robert W. Funk (
1961), pp. 188-189.
28
point regarding present
and general conditions needs to be summarized.
Gildersleeve maintains
that any conditional sentence may be particular
or general
"according to the character of the apodosis."1 The
particular character he
looks for is the use of the present tense. This
is true, according to
him, of all conditions, including the Logical and
Anticipatory
conditions:
Hence when [the logical condition] has its
apodosis in the present,
it has a double meaning, which adapts it admirably
to personal
argument. So especially when the form ei] tij is used, which may
point either to a definite or to an
indefinite person, the Logical
condition is a two-edged sword, often
wielded in the keen encounter
of Attic wit. But as the e]a<n conditional with a present indicative
apodosis is regularly generic, it is not
without reason that this
form should be preferred, when distinctly
generic action is to be
expressed.2
New Testament examples which illustrate his point include
Matthew 19:10 (ei] ou!twj e]sti<n h[ ai]ti<a
tou? a]nqrw<pou meta> th?j gunaiko<j, ou] sumfe<rei gamh?sai
- if this is the case of the man with his wife,
it is better not to
marry), a logical condition which is obviously
a general one, and John
11:9 (e]a<n tij peripath? e]n t^?
h[me<r%, ou]
prosko<ptei
- if anyone walks in the day he does not stumble), an
anticipatory condition
which is also general. Whether this holds as
a uniform rule (present
tense in apodosis = a general condition)
deserve detailed
treatment and will receive it at a later point in
this study. For now, it
is sufficient to note that Gildersleeve's
suggestion does fit
some passages in the Koine of the New Testament.
1 Gildersleeve,
"Pindar," p. 435.
2 Gildersleeve, "On ei," p. 6.
29
The second point of evaluation also relates to a
distinction
between Gildersleeve
and Goodwin. Gildersleeve's system relegates the
present general
condition of Goodwin to the anticipatory class because
of its subjunctive
mood. Conditions employing future indicative verbs
are classed as simple
or logical conditions. But what is the difference
between these two? Does
not the future indicative convey the same concept
as the present
subjunctive, for all practical purposes?
Gildersleeve answers that there is a distinction between
the
two, one which he feels
has been overlooked by many grammarians. First,
he notes, the normal pattern
for future conditions is e]a<n
with the
subjunctive: "The
fact then is patent enough to every one who will be
at pains to count, that
for model Greek prose e]a<n
with the subjunctive
is preferred to ei] with the future
indicative."1 The reason for this,
he writes,
. . . seems to be to a considerable
extent the greater temporal
exactness, the same greater temporal
exactness which has wholly
displaced the future indicative with the
temporal particles, the same
greater temporal exactness which has given
so wide a sweep to the
optative with a@n as a sharper form of
the future.2
If e]a<n with
the subjunctive is the normal form in Attic prose,
what is the role of ei] with the future
indicative? It shows
. . . a certain coldness, a certain
indifference; and this added to
the general rigor of the logical
condition, which faces fact in all
its grimness, gives a stern, minatory,
prophetic tone to the future
1 Gildersleeve, "On ei],"
p. 9.
2 Ibid.,
p. 9.
30
indicative, which commentators and
grammarians have noticed, but
noticed only in passing.1
Though Gildersleeve is speaking of conditions in Attic
Greek,
his observations give
an added dimension to the force of such conditions
in the New Testament,
such as Matthew 6:23 (e]a<n
de> o[ o]fqalmo<j sou
ponhro>j
h#, o!lon to> sw?ma< sou skoteino>n e@stai
- but if your eye is evil,
your whole body will be
darkness) and Luke 13:3 (a]lla<
e]a<n mh> metanoh?te,
pa<ntej
o[moi<wj a]polei?sqe - but unless you repent, you will all
likewise
be destroyed).
Thus Gildersleeve uses the mood of the verb as the guiding
principle of his
classification. The present general conditions as
identified by Goodwin
simply follow the pattern of Attic prose and should
be considered as a type
of anticipatory or future conditions. Further,
the use of the future
indicative not only classes the condition as a
logical condition, but
stresses the inescapable nature of the apodosis.
A third point arises over the distinction between the
indicative
and subjunctive moods.
Contrary to Gildersleeve, Goodwin maintains that
there is no distinction
between these two moods in conditional sentences
except that of time. He
devotes an entire paper to the defense of his
position and offers the
following observation:
The idea of "possibility" or
something of the kind being attached
to the subjunctive, it was naturally
supposed that the simple
indicative in protasis must have a
corresponding idea at its
foundation, and that of
"certainty" or "reality" has generally been
assigned to it.2
1 Gildersleeve, "On ei],"
p. 9.
2 "William Watson
Goodwin, "On the Classification of Conditional
Sentences
in Greek Syntax," Transactions of
the American Philological
Association,
6:1 (March, 1873), pp. 61-62.
31
He then gives several reasons for questioning that this
distinction holds up in
conditional sentences. In concluding his
argument he writes:
After the most careful study that I have
been able to give to the
subject, and especially after a comparison
of several thousand
classic examples, I am convinced that no
such principle [of
distinction] can be found. Every example
that I have met with has
only confirmed the opinion, which I can
now express with the
greatest confidence, that there is no
inherent distinction between
the present indicative and the present
subjunctive in protasis
(between ei] boule<tai and e]a<n boulh?tai)
except that of time.1
Robertson, writing some years later, defends Gildersleeve's
position against
Goodwin by pointedly hinging the meaning of the logical
condition (ei] with the indicative in
the protasis) on the significance
of the indicative mood.2 This mood, according to him, is characterized
as:
. . . the "modus rectus." It
does express "l'affirmation pure
et simple." The indicative does state a thing as true, but does not
guarantee the reality of the thing. In the nature of the case only
the statement
is under discussion. A clear grip on this point will
help one all along. The indicative has
nothing to do with reality
("on sich"). The speaker presents something as true. Actuality is
implied, to be sure, but nothing more.
Whether it is true or no is
another matter.2
Concerning the subjunctive mood, Robertson notes two
things.
First, it is probably
impossible to identify a single root-idea for
this mood. He accepts
Brugmann's identification of "three uses of the
subjunctive (the volitive, the deliberative, the futuristic."3
Thus
1 Goodwin,
"Classification," pp. 64-65.
2 Robertson, Grammar, p. 915.
3 Ibid.,
pp. 926-927.
32
the subjunctive does
not necessarily imply a specific time.
Second, there is a close connection between the aorist sub-
juctive and the future
indicative:
These [the aorist subjunctive and the
future indicative] are closely
allied in form and sense. It is quite
probable that the future
indicative is just a variation of the
aorist subjunctive . . . .
The subjunctive is always future, in
subordinate clauses relatively
future. Hence the two forms continued
side by side in the language.
There is a possible distinction.
"The subjunctive differs from the
future
indicative in stating what is thought likely to occur, not
positively what will occur."
[quoting Thompson, A Syntax of Attic
Greek, p. 133].1
Thus Robertson offers support for Gildersleeve's position
by
holding, first, to a
uniform distinction between indicative and sub-
junctive moods, and,
second, to a non-chronological significance for
the subjunctive mood
itself. The particular case of the future
indicative and the
aorist subjunctive may show a blurring of this
otherwise sharp
distinction, but Robertson will not concede confusion
in the essential modal
significance, even in conditional sentences.
It would seem, then, that the major objections against
Gildersleeve's system
raised by Goodwin can be answered. Indeed, some
of the answers are
directly related to the objections raised against
Goodwin's own approach.
Most Koine grammarians have been convinced of
the superiority of
Gildersleeve's approach and have adopted it, via
Robertson, with some
notable exceptions.
1 Robertson, Grammar,
pp. 924-925.
33
Summary of Classical
Greek Classification Systems
This somewhat detailed review of the work of Classical
gram-
marians has shown that
there is, in truth, significant disagreement
among them. Goodwin
classifies according to time, Donovan according to
fulfillment or,
non-fulfillment, Sonnenschein and Chambers according to
form, and Gildersleeve
according to determination. In terms of a
majority vote,
classical grammarians usually follow Goodwin and Koine
grammarians generally
follow Gildersleeve (or Robertson who follows
Gildersleeve).
Conditional
Sentences in Koine Greek
It is impossible to separate the advances in Koine grammar
from those of Classical
Greek, for they have moved hand-in-hand. At
times, Koine
grammarians took the work of the Classical scholars and
brought it directly
into New Testament studies, as
Goodwin's
classification of conditional sentences. Robertson is
representative of those
Koine scholars who were conversant with Classical
studies, but saw fit to
reject some of them and sharpen the focus of
others, as he did with
Gildersleeve's work on these sentences.
Nigel Turner has done the historian of grammatical studies
a
great favor by publishing
a chronological bibliography of all major
Greek works, beginning
with the first New Testament grammar published
in 1655 and ending with
the latest edition of Bauer's Worterbuch
in
1958.1
1 Nigel Turner, A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume III:
Syntax
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1963), pp. vii-x.
34
This discussion will limit itself to the major Koine
grammarians
appearing on his list,
including those who have published since he
compiled his catalog.
For organizational purposes they will be divided
into "Early"
and "Late" grammarians, with A. T. Robertson being the
dividing point. Just as
the survey of Classical grammarians illustrated
the wide range of
opinion on conditional sentences in the classic
writings, so this
survey will demonstrate that Koine studies are in a
similar state of flux.
Early Grammarians
George Benedict Winer
George Benedict Winer is identified by Dana and Mantey as
the
first grammarian to
operate with the concept that the Greek of the New
Testament is the Greek
of the common people, not a special, Holy Ghost
language.1 In the preface to the Sixth Edition of his
grammar Winer
writes:
The fundamental error--the prw?ton yeu?doj--of the Biblical
philology and exegesis to which we refer,
consisted ultimately in
this, that neither the Hebrew nor the
language of the N.T. was
regarded as a living idiom . . . designed
to be used by men as the
medium of intercourse.2
From this basis he
develops his analysis of the Koine grammar, including
that of conditional
sentences.
1 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 9.
2 Winer, Grammar,
p. v.
35
Statement of His
Position
Winer applies the results of the "enlightened
philology" of his
day to New Testament
Greek and offers this analysis of conditional or
hypothetical sentences:
In HYPOTHETICAL sentences four kinds
of construction occur:
a. Pure condition: If thy friend come, give him my regards
(the case is put as real). Here the
Indicative is used with
ei]. . . .
b. Condition with assumption of objective possibility (where
experience will decide whether or not it
is real): If thy friend
should come (I do not know whether he will come, but the
result
will show). Here e]a<n . . . with the Subjunctive is used.
c. Condition with assumption of subjective possibility, the
condition existing merely in thought: If thy
friend come (the case
being conceivable and credible) I should
be pleased to present my
respects to him. Here ei]
with the Optative is used.
d. Condition believed to be contrary
to the fact: were there a
God, he would govern (but there is
not). Had God existed from
eternity, he would have prevented evil (but he has not
existed).
Here ei] with the
Indicative is used,--the Imperf. in the first case,
the Aor. or (much more rarely) the Plup.
in the second . . .; in the
conclusion likewise one of these two
tenses.1
Summary of His Position
Winer's optimistic statement that "the diction of the
N.T. will
be found entirely in
accordance with the preceding rules" indicates his
confidence in these
four basic divisions.2 Though this has not been
fulfilled to the degree
he predicted, Winer has anticipated the major
system used by Koine
grammarians today. It is apparent that he is
following
Gildersleeve's system, though using slightly different termin-
ology. He makes no
reference to Gildersleeve, but it is possible that he
1 Winer, Grammar, p. 291.
2 Ibid.,
p. 292
36
was familiar with
Gildersleeve's work. Like him, Winer distinguishes
between ei] and the future
indicative verb in the protasis and e]]a<n
with
the subjunctive, though
he acknowledges that "such construction with the
Fut. would approximate
most nearly to that with e]a<n
. . . ."1 He
illustrates the
difference between the two in this way:
. . . but if all shall be offended in thee is a more decided
statement than if all should be offended. In the latter, it is
still altogether uncertain whether they
will be offended; in the
former, this is assumed as a future fact .
. . .2
Winer notes that "the exceptions to these rules in the
N.T.
text are but very few,
and occur for the most part only in particular
Codd."3
He discusses two types of exceptions: the
use of ei] with the
subjunctive and e]a<n with the
indicative. He does not discuss mixed
conditions, concessive particles or elliptical conditions.
Evaluation of His
Position
It is difficult at best to read many last-century
grammarians
with any degree of
comprehension. They wrote "for another eye, another
mind and another
time." He further complicates the issue by trying to
illustrate Greek
concepts from English. The difference between "If thy
friend come" and
"If thy friend should come" hardly conveys the
difference between the
indicative and subjunctive moods. His
explanatory comments
are far more helpful than his examples, which tend
to confuse the points
he tries to make.
1 Winer, Grammar, p. 293.
2 Ibid., p. 294.
37
Winer did, however, establish a significant precedent by
considering the Koine
Greek to be just that, the language of the common
man. By bringing the
concept of simple observation and induction to
bear upon the New
Testament he advanced the understanding of its
structure and pointed
the way for others to follow.
Alexander Buttmann
Alexander Buttmann followed the general rules of Winer in
his
treatment of
conditional sentences. Rather than expanding the rules at
length, Buttmann
concentrated on the deviations found in the New Testa-
ment. By this time it
was fairly evident that Winer's confident asser-
tion that all New
Testament forms were covered by his four rules was
overstated. Buttmann's
work, though, shows that Winer's four classifica-
tions are generally
true and accurately describe the majority of
conditional sentences
in the New Testament.
Statement of His
Position
Buttmann observed that the first two forms of conditional
sentences (ei] with the indicative
and e]a<n with the
subjunctive) are by
far the most frequent
forms in the New Testament.1 He also stressed the
importance of mood as
the determining factor in evaluating the kind of
condition:
The difference between them [the two
types of conditional
sentences] . . . is plainly to be
recognized in sentences where
both are used in close proximity; as Gal.
i. 8,9, where the
1 Buttmann, Grammar,
p. 220.
38
hypothesis expressed in the 8th verse by e]a<n with the Subjunctive
is resumed or repeated in the 9th verse
with greater energy and
definiteness by ei] with the Indicative.
So in Acts v. 38, 39.1
Comparison of His
Position
Buttmann's analysis of the exceptions to Winer's rules
centers
on two areas: the use
of ei] and e][a<n with the indicative
and subjunctive
moods respectively, and
the use of a@n
in conditions contrary to fact.
Particles and moods.--His analysis of the particles
and their
corresponding moods is
one of the first treatments of the topic that
discusses the problem
of variant readings.
Of the first case, the use of ei]
with the Subjunctive, we find, to
be sure, accidentally . . . no example
which is quite certain; for
in some of them the readings vary, some
are set aside by the MSS.
(as Rev. xi. 5 [but cod. Sin. qelh?sh the second time]), some are
capable of a special interpretation.2
He also lists I
Corinthians 9:11 and Luke 9:13 as possible examples of
this exception.
Regarding the use of e]a<n with the indicative he
notes that this
"is given so
frequently, that it is to be eliminated as little from the
writings of the N.T. as
of the Old."3 Buttmann
does concede that most of
these examples may be
questioned upon textual evidence, but argues
that the variants were
introduced when the copyists altered the original
and more difficult
indicative.
1 Buttmann, Grammar, p. 220.
2 Ibid., p. 221.
3 Ibid.,
p. 222.
39
It is, indeed, not to be denied that
the instances in question
almost disappear amid the multitude of
those that are grammatically
regular, and suspicion may also be raised
by the circumstance that
hardly a single passage with the
Indicative is completely beyond
question critically. Yet when we consider
that in countless
passages with the Subjunctive not the
smallest variation is found
(which would not be the case if the
Indicative were chargeable solely
to the copyists), it is far more probable
that, where a diversity of
readings occurs in such a number of
instances, this fact results
from the circumstance that the copyists,
commentators, etc., early
altered the Indicative which gave them
offence.1
Specific examples will
be considered in a later section of this study,
but Buttmann's
consideration of variant readings marks a significant
advance in the detailed
study of conditional sentences.
Conditions contrary to fact.--The second area of
deviation
Buttmann examined was
the use of a@n
in the fourth class of conditions:
conditions contrary to
fact. He noted that the apodosis regularly
included a@n, but recognized that
this was not an absolute principle.
He listed four rules to
explain the disappearance of a@n
from these
apodoses:
a) When a@n has already
been expressed previously in the same
connection with another predicate. This
instance, which often occurs
in the classics and is found in the
nature of the case, is acci-
dentally not to be met with in the text
of the N. T. . . .
b) When the predicate (or the copula)
to which it belongs is
also dropped, as I Cor. xii. 19 . . . .
c) Where the apodosis contains such a
predicative term as e]dei>,
kalo<n h#n, h]du<nato, etc. This
omission . . . is so necessary
according to Greek habits of thought, that
it is only by way of
concession to our usage that we can speak
of supplying a@n.
d) Lastly, a@n
is dropped for rhetorical reasons: where,
though the fact itself is impossible or
improbable, the orator in
the vivacity of his thought desires to
represent it as actually
1 Buttmann, Grammar,
p. 222.
40
having occurred, or at
least as almost taken place.1
Most modern grammarians dispense with these rules, simply
noting that a@n usage is at best
unpredictable. Robertson, for example,
simply states that
"There is no principle involved in a@n,
simply custom."2
Buttmann was willing to
recognize that the particle may be absent from a
condition without
upsetting the force of that sentence, and this is the
emphasis of modern
grammars.
Evaluation of His
Position
Buttmann gets credit for a more thorough study of the
conditional
sentence than that of
Winer. He accepted Winer's four categories, but
noted several major
exceptions to them, especially in the variant
readings. Buttmann and
Winer both placed emphasis upon mood as the
determining factor in
classifying conditional sentences rather than the
particles or tense. It
remained for other grammarians to state this
principle in more
formal terms.
Samuel G. Green
Published around 1887, Samuel G. Green's Handbook of the Greek
Testament
presents an analysis of conditional sentences that follows the
patterns of Winer and
Buttmann.3
1 Buttmann, Grammar, pp. 225-226.
2 Robertson, Grammar. p. 1007.
3 Samuel G. Green, Handbook to the Grammar of the Greek Testament
(
41
Statement of His
Position
Briefly, Green identifies four kinds of conditions or
hypotheses:
a. The
supposition of a fact.
b. “
“ of a possibility.
g. “ “ of uncertainty.
d. “ “ of something unfulfilled.1
These four types of
conditions are indicated by four distinct
forms:
a. The
conditional particle ei], if,
with the Indicative in the
protasis, assumes the hypothesis as a
fact. The apodosis may have
the Indicative or Imperative.
b. Possibility or
uncertainty with the prospect of decision, is
expressed by e]a<n = ei] a@n (very rarely by
ei]
alone [He lists I Cor. 14:5,
Phil. 3:12, and a few various readings,
such as in Rev. 11:5, as
examples.] with the Subjunctive in the
conditional clause, and the
Indicative or Imperative in the apodosis.
g. The Optative
in a conditional sentence expresses entire
uncertainty--a supposed case. Here the
particle ei] is always used.
d.
When the condition is spoken of as unfulfilled, the
Indicative is used in both clauses, with
the particle ei] in the
protasis, and a@n in the apodosis.2
Evaluation of His
Position
As is evident, Green's system of analysis is the same as
those
already discussed: four
types of condition, each identified by a
particular combination
of particles and moods, and each conveying a
different concept.
Winer, Buttmann and Green all seek to analyze
conditional sentences
in terms of form, especially that of mood. They
differ little from the
popular scheme of Robertson.
1 Green, Grammar, p. 317.
2 Ibid.,
pp. 317-319.
42
Ernest DeWitt Burton
Ernest DeWitt Burton was both a scholar and an
administrator,
having served as the
chairman of the Department of New Testament and
Early Christian
Literature and later as the president of the University
of Chicago.1
In his major Greek work, Moods and Tenses of New Testament
Greek,
he adopts Goodwin's analysis of conditional sentences and applies
it to the New
Testament.2
Statement of His
Position
His specific position, following Goodwin, is:
A. Simple Present or Past Particular
Supposition. The protasis
simply states a supposition which refers
to a particular case in
the present or past, implying nothing as
to its fulfillment. The
protasis is expressed by ei]
with a present or past tense of the
Indicative; any form of the finite verb
may stand in the apodosis.
John 15:20; ei]
e]me> e]di<wcan, kai> u[ma?j diw<cousin, if they have persecuted
me, they,will also persecute you.
Gal. 5:18; ei]
de> pneu<mati a@gesqe, ou]k e]ste> u[po> no<mon, but if ye are
led by the Spirit, ye are not under
the law.
See also Matt. 4:3;
Luke 16:11; Acts 5:39;
B. Supposition Contrary to Fact. The
protasis states a supposi-
tion which refers to the present or past,
implying that it is not or
was
not fulfilled.
The protasis is expressed by ei]
with a past tense of the
Indicative; the apodosis by a past tense
of the Indicative with an.
John 11:21; Ku<rie,
ei] h#j w$de ou]k a@n a]pe<qanen o[ a]delfo<j mou, Lord, if
thou
hadst been here, my brother would not have died.
Gal. 1:10;
ei] e@ti a]nqrw<poij h@reskon,
Xristou? dou?loj ou]k a@n h@mhn, if I
were still pleasing men, I should not
be a servant of Christ.
See also John 14:28; Acts 18:14; Heb. 4:8; 11:15.
1 Charles Thwing, "
Dictionary of
American Biography,
ed. by Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone
(New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), pp. 341-342.
2 Ernest DeWitt
Greek
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1897), p. 101.
43
C. Future Supposition with More
Probability. The protasis
states a supposition which refers to the
future, suggesting some
probability of its fulfillment.
The protasis is usually expressed by e]a<n (or a@n) with the
Subjunctive; the apodosis by the Future
Indicative or by some other
form referring to future time.
Matt. 9:21; e]a<n mo<non a!ywmai tou? i[mati<ou a]tou?
swqh<somai,
if I shall
but touch his garments, I shall be
made whole.
John 12:26; e]a<n tij e]moi> diakonh? timh<sei au]to>n o[
path<r,
if any man
serve me, him will the Father honor.
John 14:15; e[a<n
a]gapa?te< me, ta>j e]ntola>j
ta>j e]ma>j thrh<sete, if ye
love me, ye will keep my commandments. See also Matt.
5:20;
I Cor. 4:19; Gal. 5:2; Jas. 2:15,16.
D. Future Supposition with Less
Probability. The protasis
states a supposition which refers to the
future, suggesting less
probability of its fulfillment than is suggested
by e]a<n with the
Subjunctive. There is no perfect example
of this form in the New
Testament.
The protasis is expressed by ei]
with the Optative; the apodosis by
the Optative with a@n.
I
Pet. 3:17; krei?tton ga>r a]gaqopoiou?ntaj, ei]
qe<loi to> qe<lhma tou?
qeou?,
pa<sxein h@ kakopoiou?ntaj, for it is
better, if the will of
God should so will, that ye suffer for
well doing than for evil
doing.
See also I Cor. 14:10; 15:37; I Pet. 3:14.
E. Present General Supposition. The
supposition refers to any
occurrence of an act of a certain class in
the (general) present,
and the apodosis states what is wont to
take place in any instance
of an act of the class referred to in the
protasis.
The protasis is expressed by e]a<n with the Subjunctive, the
apodosis by the Present Indicative.
John 11:9; ea]<n
tij peripath? e]n t^? h[me<r%, ou] prosko<ptei, if a man
walk in the day, he stumbleth not.
2 Tim. 2:5; e]a<n de> kai< a]qlh? tij, ou]
stefanou?tai e]a<n mh> nomi<mwj
a]qlh<sh, and if also a man contend in the games, he
is not
crowned, unless he contend lawfully. See also Mark
3:24; John
7:51; 12:24; I Cor. 7:39, 40.
F. Past General Supposition. The
supposition refers to any
past occurrence of an act of a certain
class, and the apodosis
states what was wont to take place in any
instance of an act of the
class referred to in the protasis.
The protasis is expressed by ei]
with the Optative, the apodosis
by the Imperfect Indicative.
44
There is apparently no instance of
this form in the New Testa-
ment.1
In addition to these general classifications,
interesting
observations regarding the specific classes. He notes that
in the first type
. . . the Future Indicative may stand in
the protasis of a conditional
sentence of the first class when reference
is had to a present
necessity or intention, or when the writer
desires to state not what
will take place on the fulfillment of a
future possibility, but merely
to affirm a necessary logical consequence
of a future event.2
This differs from
Goodwin's position that the future indicative and the
subjunctive may have
the same significance in conditional sentences.
The third class of conditional sentences may also have
these
constructions in the
protasis: (a) ei]
with the Subjunctive, (b) ei]
or
e]a<n
with the Future Indicative, and (c) ei]
with the Present Indicative.3
Conditions of this last
form are apparently first class conditions, but
"are distinguished
by evident reference of the protasis to the future."4
Concerning the fifth class, the Present General
Supposition, he
notes that some
conditions using ei]
with the indicative "apparently
express a present
general supposition," which does not fit his rule that
such conditions use e]a<n with the
subjunctive.5 He explains
that it is
1 Burton, Syntax,
pp. 102-106.
2
Ibid., p. 103.
3 Ibid., pp. 104-105.
4 Ibid., p. 105.
5 Ibid.,
p. 107.
45
difficult to
distinguish between this form of a present general condition
and that of a simple
condition:
Yet in most New Testament passages of
this kind, it is possible that
a particular imagined instance in the
present or future is before the
mind
as an illustration of the general class of cases . . . . It is
scarcely possible to decide in each case
whether the supposition was
conceived of as general or particular
Luke 14:26; ei@ tij e@rxetai pro<j me kai> ou] misei? . . . th>n
yuxh>n
e[autou?,
ou] du<natai ei#nai< mou maqhth<j, if
any man cometh unto
me,
and hateth not . . . his own life, he cannot be my disciple.
Cf. John 1:51; 12:26; where in
protases of apparently similar
force e]a<n with the
Subjunctive occurs, and the apodosis refers to
the future.
Rom. 8:25; ei] de> o! ou] ble<pomen e]lpi<zomen,
di ] u[pomonh?j a]pekdexo<meqa,
but if we hope for that which we see not,
then do we with
patience wait for it.
See also Jas. 1:26.1
According to form, such
conditions are simple conditions, but according
to interpretation, they
may be considered a variety of present general
conditions. The
distinction, it must be stressed, is one of interpreta-
tion, not form.
Classification should be on an objective basis, such
as form, not upon a
subjective one, such as interpretation.
Summary of His Position
In addition to these details,
peculiarities of
conditional sentences. He lists nine of these, including
(1) mixed forms, (2)
multiple protases, each with its unique emphasis,
(3) the use of a
participle, an imperative or other form of expression
"suggesting a
supposition" to supply the protasis, and (4) the observation
that sometimes either
the protasis or the apodosis may be omitted.2
1 Burton, Syntax,
pp. 107-108.
2 Ibid., pp. 109-112.
46
One final comment:
of "reality"
or "unreality" in these conditions as that of the speaker or
his hearers, not in the
external situation:
It should be observed that the titles
of the several classes
of conditional sentences describe the
supposition not from the
point of view of fact, but from that of
the representation of the
case to the speaker's own mind or to that
of his hearers.1
Conditional sentences
do speak of many things that are objectively true,
but the demonstration
of their factuality lies in the external world,
not in the internal
world of the conditional statement.
James Hope Moulton
The Prolegomena
to James Hope Moulton's A Grammar of the
New
Testament
was the first major grammar to utilize the newly discovered
evidence from the
papyri.2 This work was
followed by his Introduction to
the
Study of New Testament Greek, a formal grammar.3
Moulton had
originally conceived of
his major work, A Grammar of the New
Testament,
in terms of three
volumes. He published Volume I:
Prolegomena in 1906,
and it quickly went
through three editions in two years. He produced
the rough draft for
parts I and II of the second volume, but was not
permitted to finish it.
While at sea he died "in the
1
2 James Hope Moulton, A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume I:
Prolegomena, third edition
(Edinburgh: T. S T. Clark, 1908), p. 4.
3 James Hope Moulton, An Introduction to the Study of New Testa-
ment
Greek (
47
in April, 1917, a
victim of the ruthless submarine campaign."1 Nigel Turner
continues the
interesting story:
His pupil, Dr. W. F. Howard, saw that
volume through the press in
parts, from 1919 to 1929, but before he
had opportunity to lay many
plans for Volume III he himself died in
1952; and then, on condition
that he had the assistance of someone who
would collect the necessary
material, Dr. H. G. Meecham assumed
responsibility for the syntax.
It was on Dr. G. D. Kilpatrick's
suggestion that I was permitted to
help at this point, and we had done no
more than compile a provisional
bibliography when Dr. Meecham died in
1955. By the kind invitation of
the publishers I then worked alone and
broke the spell by living to
complete Volume III.2
Since he was anticipating two more volumes, Dr. Moulton did
little
more than mention a few
aspects of conditional sentences in the Prolegomena.
Fortunately, his Introduction to the Study of New Testament
Greek gives
a relatively complete
presentation of his views on the classification of
these clauses.
Statement of His
Position
First, the general comments from his Prolegomena will be
presented. To begin
with, he notes that the distinction between ei]
and e]a<n
. . . has been considerably lessened in
Hellenistic as compared with
earlier Greek. We have seen that e]a<n can take the indicative; while
(as rarely in classical Greek) ei] can be found with the
subjunctive.3
Regarding
the constructional distinctions of conditional sentences,
Moulton makes the
following observations:
1 James Hope Moulton and W.
F. Howard, A Grammar of New Testament
Greek. Volume
II: Accidence and Word Formation (
1929),
p. v.
2 Nigel Turner, A Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume
III:
Syntax
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1963), p. v.
3 Moulton, Prolegomena,
p. 187.
48
The differentation of construction remains
at present stereotyped:
ei] goes with
indicative, is used exclusively when past tenses come
in (e.g. Mk 326), and uses ou]
as its negative; while e]a<n, retaining
mh< exclusively,
takes the subjunctive almost invariably, unless the
practically synonymous future indicative
is used. Ea@n and ei] are both
used, however, to express future
conditions . . . The immense
majority of conditional sentences in the NT
belong to these heads.1
Moulton opts for Blass's principle as opposed to Goodwin's
to
explain the use of the
optative mood in these sentences:
Meanwhile we may observe that Blass's
dictum (p. 213) that
ei] c. opt. form is
used "if I wish to represent anything as generally
possible, without regard to the general
or actual situation at the
moment," suits the NT exx. well; and
it seems to fit the general
facts better than Goodwin's doctrine of a
"less vivid future"
condition (Goodwin, Greek Grammar, 301).2
He specifically
identifies Acts 8:31 as an example of a conditional
sentence employing a@n with the optative to
which Goodwin's "less vivid"
form does not apply.
3
However, he does follow Goodwin's general system for the
overall
classification of
conditional sentences. Three general classes are
recognized:
Simple Conditions in present or past
time.
Protasis,
ei] with
indicative; Apodosis, generally
indicative, always
without a]n.
These sentences merely
join together a condition and a result without
any indication as to
the probability or improbability of the condition.
1 Moulton, Prolegomena, p. 187.
2 Ibid., p. 196, note.
3 Ibid., pp. 198-199.
4 Ibid.,
p. 199.
49
Unfulfilled Conditions in present and
past time.
Protasis,
ei]
with indicative, imperfect for present time, aorist for
past.
Apodosis,
indicative with a@n,
imperfect for present time, aorist for
past.
Future Conditions.
Protasis,
e]a<n with subjunctive (rarely indicative, or ei]
with subjunc-
tive).
Apodosis,
future indicative, sometimes the imperative.1
He classifies the optative condition, Robertson's Fourth
Class
Condition, as a special
form of the Future Condition, noting that its
full expression has
vanished in the Koine and only parts of such conditions
appear in the New
Testament.
Modern
Grammarians
Archibald Thomas
Robertson
Of all modern Koine grammarians, none has exerted the
influence or
achieved the status of
Archibald Thomas Robertson. As professor of New
Testament at the
Southern Baptist Theological Seminary from 1890 to
1934 he helped form
modern opinion about Koine Greek. With few exceptions
contemporary
grammarians have adopted his terminology and viewpoint,
especially on
conditional sentences. Thus his position requires detailed
study in order to fully
comprehend the current majority view of
conditional sentences
in the New Testament.
Statement of His
Position
His system of analysis basically follows that of
Gildersleeve
in Classical Greek by
identifying four types of conditions, each
1 Moulton, Introduction
to New Testament Greek, pp. 210-213.
50
determined by the mood
of the protasis.
His summary.--Robertson first summarizes the
importance of mood
in conditions:
The indicative mode in the condition
always makes a clear-cut
assertion one way or the
other [fulfilled or unfulfilled]. If the
subjunctive or the optative is used in the
condition (protasis) a
doubtful statement is made
whatever may be the actual fact or truth
in
the case. By these modes of doubtful statement the condition
puts it as doubtful or undetermined (not put in a clear--cut way).
If the subjunctive is used, there is less
doubt than if the optative
is used, precisely the difference between
these two modes of doubtful
statement.1
This distinction in mood (indicative = fulfilled or
unfulfilled,
subjunctive = doubt,
optative = more doubt) leads to the natural
conclusion that there
are four types of conditional sentences:
(a) First Class: Determined as Fulfilled
(ei],
sometimes e]a<n,
with any tense of the indicative in
condition. Any tense of the
indicative in the conclusion).
(b) Second Class: Determined as Unfulfilled
(ei]
and only past
tenses of the indicative in condition.
Only past tenses in the
conclusion, usually with a@n
to make clear the kind of condition
used).
(c) Third Class: Undetermined with Prospect
of Determination
(e]a<n or ei]
with the subjunctive in the condition, usually future
or present indicative or imperative in
the conclusion, much variety
in the form of the conclusion).
(d) Fourth Class: Undetermined with
Remote Prospect
Determination (ei] with
the optative in the condition, a@n and the
optative in the conclusion).2
1 A. T. Robertson and W.
Hersey Davis, A New Short Grammar of
the Greek
Testament
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1933), p. 349.
2 Ibid.,
pp. 349-350.
51
His Defence.--In defending this analysis, Robertson
speaks
against the popular
forms of classification, especially that of Goodwin.
First he rejects the
concept of particular and general as a basic
principle of
classification. Actually the concept of time was the key
principle of Goodwin,
but the particular-general division was important.
In any event, Robertson
points to the work of Gildersleeve and says of
Goodwin's distinction:
"This is a false step in itself."1 He accepts
Gildersleeve's position
that any condition may be particular or general,
depending upon the type
of verb used in the protasis.
Robertson then raises his next and most serious objection
to
Goodwin and those
following him: they refuse to recognize the basic
significance of the
mood in conditions. Goodwin's first class of
conditions utilizes the
indicative mood and, he says, "simply states a
present or past
particular supposition, implying nothing as to the
fulfillment of the condition
. . . .2 Robertson strongly
objects to
this interpretation,
claiming that "This condition pointedly
implies the
fulfillment of the
condition."3 Robertson
hinges his argument on the
basic significance of
the indicative mood which, he claims, has its usual
meaning in conditions
as well as normal clauses. This is, as he says,
"the crux of the
whole matter."4 Goodwin's classification seems to
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1005.
2 Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, p. 145.
3 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1006.
4 Ibid.,
p. 1006.
51
place emphasis on
things other than mood, relegating it to a position
of lesser importance.
For Robertson, mood is all-important. He
pursues his analysis on
this assumption.
One specific detail of his system needs further comment:
the
first class condition
labeled as "Determined as Fulfilled."
Robertson
quotes Gildersleeve as
identifying this condition as "the favorite
condition," though
he is talking about classical poets, especially
Pindar.1 The question already raised by Robertson
relates to the
degree of determination
implied by the condition. Is the speaker
presenting the
condition as something that is objectively true
(ei@ tij qe<lei o]pi<sw mou
e@rxesqai, a]rnhsa<sqw e[auto<n - Since someone
does wish to come after
me, let him deny himself. Luke 9:23)? Or
is the
speaker assuming the
truth of the condition without committing himself
to a position one way
or the other, such as might be done "for the
sake of the
argument" (ei]
de> a]na<stasij nekrw?n ou]k e@stin, ou]de> Xristo>j
e]gh>gertai
-
But if there is no resurrection of the dead, then Christ
is not raised. I Cor.
15:13)? This point will receive a more detailed
treatment later, but it
is important to note that some commentators
have understood
Robertson to say that the first class condition actually
affirms the objective
reality of the condition. Perhaps his statements
could have been more
precise, but common sense will suffice to show
that this cannot be the
case in all situations. If it were, then
Christ would have been
operating in the power of the Devil (Matt. 12:27)
1 Robertson, Grammar,
p. 1007.
53
and would not be
resurrected (I Cor. 15:13). Yet writers continue to
to read objective
reality into the first class condition. An extreme
example is the
statement of Jerome Moore:
The first class condition implies
truth or reality. If . . .
and it is true. Colossians 1:23 . . . is
an example of this. The
idea there is, "If ye continue in
the faith grounded and settled,
and
ye shall!" There is no doubt
implied here. This is a condition
of reality. No need to doubt the security
of your salvation or any-
one else's, for if here in the Greek does not imply doubt.1
Were the situation not so serious, it would be funny. No
one can guarantee the
salvation of anyone else. Certainly Paul
challenged the
Corinthians to test and examine themselves (2 Cor. 13:5).
Obviously some contexts
permit the English "since" with its implication
of objective reality,
but many, indeed, a majority, do not. To make
such claims is to
ignore common sense, the teaching of Robertson and
the clear statements of
Scripture.
In his doctoral dissertation John Battle describes
Robertson
as "difficult to
read."2 Perhaps the
wordiness of his Historical
Grammar
led to some contradictory statements in the minds of some, but
in the first edition of
his Shorter Grammar, he clearly
states:
This condition does assume the reality of the condition. Take
Matt. 12:27. Christ did not cast out
demons by Beelzebub, but
in argument he assumes it. The indicative
mode determines the
condition as fulfilled, so far as the
statement is concerned.3
1 Jerome Moore, "
45:1
(June, 1979), p. 11.
2 John A.
Exegesis,"
unpublished Th.D. dissertation, Grace Theological Seminary,
1975,
D. 170.
3 A. T. Robertson, A Short Grammar of the Greek New Testament
(New York: A. C.
Armstrong & Son, 1908), p. 151.
54
At times this
assumption is parallel with the objective reality of
the statement, as in I
Thessalonians 4:14 – ei]
ga>r pisteu<omen o!ti
]Ihsouj
a]pe<qanen kai> a]ne<sth . . . ; for if we
believe that Jesus died and
rose again. In other
contexts the assumption is counter to the
objective reality, as
in Matthew 12:27 – kai>
ei] e]gw> e]n Beezebou>l
e]kba<llw
ta> daimo<nia . . . ; and if I by the power of
Beelzebub cast out
the demons. In still
other situations (probably the majority of those
in the New Testament)
the assumption is neither parallel nor counter
to objective reality,
for the reality cannot be determined from the
information at hand.
This is the situation in Colossians 1:23 – ei@
ge
e]pime<nete
t^? pi<stei . . .; if you continue in the faith. The best
English word to use in
all three situations is "if," and all major
English translations of
the New Testament uniformly translate the
first class condition
this way.
Evaluation of His
Position
A. T. Robertson's analysis of conditional sentences has
blazed
a trail that many have
followed in New Testament studies. His
terminology has become
almost universal, and his rejection of Goodwin's
system has been
accepted by almost all who have followed him. Unfortun-
ately, some have taken
Robertson too simply and have read verification
(or non-verification)
of external or objective reality into his First
and Second Class
conditions. One could wish that he had been more
precise in his
statements, but such difficulties are no excuse for
the misuse of his
concepts one finds in the literature.
55
William Douglas
Chamberlain
As a professor at Louisville Presbyterian Seminary, William
Douglas Chamberlain
first published his Greek grammar in 1941: His
analysis is a concise summary
of Robertson's work. Only a few remarks
need be made to
indicate additional information he provides.
Statement of His
Position
Accepting Robertson's terminology, he affirms that in first
class
conditions "The
protasis has to do with the way the statement is made, and
not with the truth or
falsity of it."1 Untrue
conditions may be assumed
to be true for the sake
of the argument. Matthew 12:27 is presented as
an example of this
situation.
In second class conditions he, like Robertson, identifies
the
tenses used as past
tenses: imperfect, aorist or pluperfect. It is
possible to have
different tenses in the protasis and the apodosis, as
in John 14:28. While
"the viewpoint is changed between the protasis and
the apodosis," the
entire sentence is still a second class condition:
"These are not
'mixed conditions."'2
He identifies the third class conditions as those which are
"stated as a
matter of doubt, with some prospect of fulfillment."3
The fourth class is
"even more doubtful than the third class."4 While
1 William
New Testament (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1952), p. 195.
2 Ibid., p. 197.
3 Ibid.,
p. 198.
4 Ibid.,
p. 199.
56
he finds no complete
example of this condition in the New Testament, he
does identify fragments
in I Peter 3:14, I Corinthians 15:37, Acts 17:27,
and Acts 27:39.1
Chamberlain discusses two other aspects of conditional
sentences which are
also mentioned in Robertson, though not in so
succinct a manner:
Mixed Conditions and Elliptical Conditions. The
first involves a change
in class of condition between the protasis and
the apodosis, for the
"writer changes his viewpoint between the protasis
and the apodosis."2
Luke 17:6 is listed as an example.
The second topic, elliptical conditions, involves
conditional
sentences in which the
apodosis is expressed and the protasis is simply
implied. He lists four
ways this is accomplished:
1. By the participle: Rom. 2:27.
2. By a verb in the imperative mode: Mark 1:17.
3. The protasis may be abbreviated to the vanishing point
as with
ei]
mh>
in the case of 'except': Mt. 11:27.
4. The apodosis may be omitted: Luke 19:42.3
Chamberlain also notes
that the Hebraistic use of ei]
in oaths
(Mark 8:12), and its
use to introduce direct questions (Acts 1:6) are
not conditional
sentences.4
Evaluation of His
Position
Chamberlain's little grammar provides a very readable
synthesis
of Robertson's position
without going into the fine details of historical
1 Chamberlain, Grammar, p. 199.
2 Ibid., p. 199.
3 Ibid., p. 199
4 Ibid., p. 200.
57
analysis. Mood is the
key factor in determining the type of conditional
sentence, and the
indicative mood identifies sentences which present
the condition as true.
Charles Francis Digby
Moule
The English scholar C. F. D. Moule, publishing in 1953,
follows neither
Robertson nor Goodwin in his analysis of conditional
sentences. He presents
a unique system of both construction and
application, setting
aside many of the chief dicta of other grammarians.
Statement of His
Position
He summarizes the various conditions under three headings:
1. Past or present conditions, possible or actual.
2. Recurrent or future conditions, whether real or hypothetical.
3. Past or present conditions, only hypothetical.1
In outline form his
system looks like this:
1. Past or present conditions,
possible or actual.
Protasis: ei] with the
indicative in the appropriate tense.
Apodosis: another indicative
or its equivalent [an imperative,
as in Col. 4:10, or conceivably a participle] in the appro-
priate tense.
2. Recurrent or future conditions,
whether real or hypothetical.
Protasis: ei] (or
o!te)
with a@n (making e]a<n,
o[ta<n)
with the
subjunctive in the appropriate tense.
Apodosis: Indicative or its
equivalent [imperative or
participle] in
the appropriate tense.
3. Past or present conditions, only hypothetical.
1 C[harles] F[rancis]
D[igby] Moule, An Idiom Book of New Testa-
ment
Greek (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), p.
148.
58
Protasis:
ei]
with a past tense of the indicative.
Apodosis:
a past (but not necessarily the same) tense of the
indicative, usually with a@n.1
He sums up his concept of conditional sentences by stating:
Thus the form of a conditional
sentence is largely determined
by two main factors—time (past, present,
future) or Aktionsart
(instantaneous, protracted, recurrent,
etc.) and the degree of
reality (impossible, improbable, possible,
probable, actual).2
Specific factors which
help determine the mood of conditional sentences
include:
(a) Any past condition introduced by if
must, in the nature of the
case, be hypothetical, if not definitely
unreal: otherwise there
would be nothing conditional about the sentence. Therefore there
appears to be no need to vary the mood,
and it is regularly
Indicative.
(b) But present, future, or recurrent conditions may vary widely
in their degree of actuality: hence
(perhaps) the variation in
moods. In general, the Indic. represents
certainty, while the
Subj. represents something more
hypothetical or uncertain.3
Moule thus recognizes
the basic significance of these moods, but he
employs them in a
unique system of analysis.
Evaluation of His
Position
Two observations may be made about this analysis. First,
Moule maintains that
the apodosis is always in the indicative mood
regardless of the mood
of the protasis. The specific examples will
be discussed in the
next chapter, but this is an over-simplification, as
Galatians 5:25
demonstrates. Second and more important, this approach
1 Moule, Idiom Book, pp. 148-149.
2 Ibid., p. 150.
3 Ibid.,
p. 149.
59
seems to produce
sentences that are one class by form and another by
meaning. Moule thinks
that this is a problem:
The difficulty of classifying is
illustrated by sentences which
belong by meaning in one class, but by form
in another; e.g.:
(1) in form, (2) in meaning: II Tim.
ii:12 ei] u[pome<nomen, kai>
sunbasileu<somen; II John 10 ei@ tij
e@rxetai pro>j u[ma?j kai> tau<thn
th>n didaxh>n ou] fe<rei, mh> lamba<nete au]to>n. Both these
might well
have had ean with Subj. in the
protasis. (1), in meaning, (2) in
form: I Cor. ix. 16 e]a>n ga>r eu]aggeli<zwmai, ou]k e@stin moi
kau<xhma . . . .1
But is this really a problem? The two examples listed as
being class 1 (possible
or actual) by form and class 2 (recurrent or
future conditons) by
meaning, 2 Tim. 2:12 and 2 John 10, are straight-
forward first class
conditions in both form and meaning. It is futile
to suggest what
"might well" have been written, for the text has been
set down as God wanted
it given. One might feel that an exegetical
problem could be solved
by treating 2 Tim. 2:12 as a hypothetical
condition, but such is
not the case. It is a first class and needs
to be interpreted as
such. So with 1 Cor. 9:16; it is
presented as
a hypothetical condition,
even though facts outside the condition
establish that it is an
actual situation. There is no need to rewrite
the statement.
It seems reasonable to ask, If one's analysis produces such
apparent contradictions
as Moule felt his did, should the analysis be
pursued? It
seems-unlikely that such diverse situations would arise in
the normal development
of a language. Significant also is the fact that
no other grammarian has
followed Moule in this approach. All seem to
1 Moule,
Idiom Book, p. 149.
60
have recognized the
weakness in his system.
Friedrich Blass -
Albert Debrunner
In 1911 Friedrich Blass published his Grammar of New Testament
Greek.
It passed through several editions and translations and was
continued after his
death by Albert Debrunner, a professor of Indo-
European and classical
Philology at the
W. Funk of the
revision of this work
as a companion grammar to Arnt and Gingrich's
Lexicon.
Funk's revision is the one under consideration.
Statement of His
Position
Blass-Debrunner recognizes five forms of conditional
sentences
in Classical Greek,
four of which are present in the New Testament:
(1) Ei] with the
indicative of all tenses denotes a simple
conditional assumption with emphasis on
the reality of the assump-
tion (not of what is being assumed): the
condition is considered
'a real case.'
(2) Ei] with the
optative presents something as thought of,
without regard for reality or unreality,
and emphasizes the
hypothetical character of the assumption:
'a potential case.'
(3) Ei] with an
augmented tense of the indicative marks the
assumption as contrary to fact: 'an
unreal case.'
(4)
]Ea<n with the subjunctive
denotes that which under certain
circumstances is expected from an existing
general or concrete
standpoint in the present: 'case of
expectation.'
(5) Ei] with the
optative also specifies repetition in past
time.1
Of these five forms, (2) has almost disappeared from the
New Testament
and (5) has completely
disappeared. Blass-Debrunner thus comes close
to Robertson's (and
Gildersleeve's) four conditions. Indeed, Funk
1 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar, p. 188.
61
speaks of Robertson's
organization as "especially lucid."1 Unfortunately,
neither
Blass-Debrunner's nor Funk's comments have the same quality, so
some explanatory
comments are necessary.
The first group, the "real case," speaks of
. . . a present reality = 'if . . .
really' (as you say, as is
believed, as you see, etc.) or = 'if
therefore' (resulting from
what has been said), often closely
bordering on causal
'since' . . . .2
Were one to change the
adverb "often" to "infrequently," he would be
closer to the truth of
the New Testament. He comes closer in his
first statement that
this condition places emphasis on "the reality of
the assumption (not of
what is being assumed)." This distinction between
the statement of a
situation and the actual situation itself must be
maintained. In Matthew
12:27, for example, Jesus speaks of His
exorcism in a way that
is directly counter to the reality of the situa-
tion. This fits
Blass-Debrunner's statement.
The third group, ei]
with an augmented indicative verb,
indicates a condition
that is contrary to fact. Unlike Classical Greek,
the "addition of a@n to the apodosis is no
longer obligatory."3 These
conditions are
"remarkably scarce in Paul."4
1 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar, p. 189.
2 Ibid., p. 189.
3 Ibid., p. 182.
4 Ibid.,
p. 182.
62
The fourth group, e]a<n
with the subjunctive, refers to future
situations. These
situations may be of a general or specific nature
("general or
concrete standpoint"), corresponding to the often-mentioned
present general
condition. The use of e]a<n
with the subjunctive to
refer to future time is
normal. "There is," he notes, "no certain
example of e]a<n with the future
indicative in the NT."1 This
is not
unexpected, for there
has always been a close affinity between the
future indicative and
the subjunctive. Indeed, the origin of the future
indicative may well
have been a mixture of "the Indo-European future,
which denoted future
time, and the subjunctive of the sigmatic aorist."2
This close relationship
has been noted before.
Evaluation of His
Position
Blass-Debrunner agrees with Robertson in his stress upon
the
limitation of the
reality of the first class condition to the statement,
not the situation.
Although Funk respects Robertson's analysis, he
retains the original
terminology of Blass's work. While there may
not be general
agreement between this grammar and that of Robertson on
titles, there is on the
forms and their significance.
Nigel Turner
Nigel Turner's role in finishing the grammar started by
Moulton
has already been set
forth. His volume on syntax represents conditional
1 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar, p. 190.
2 Ibid.,
p. 166.
63
sentences under their
respective parts: moods, tenses, etc. Only
towards the end does he
summarize his conclusions.
Statement of His
Position
In outline form his analysis is:
(i) ei]
with indic., representing the simple assumption . . .
(ii) ei]
with opt., representing the "potential" conception . . . .
(iii) ei]
with aor. or impf. indic., representing an assumption as
not corresponding with
reality . . . .
(iv) e]a<n with subj., indicating an expected result based on
the
present general or particular circumstance . . .
.1
Turner presents a
system of analysis that combines features of Moulton
along with some of
Goodwin. It is instructive to see what new insights
this gives for each of
these conditions.
Details of His Position
Turner does not give a detailed discussion of the first
type
of condition except to
note that ei]
with the future indicative,
unlike e]a<n with the
present subjunctive, calls attention to "The
feeling of definiteness
and actual realization [that] accompanies it.
It is almost
causal."2 He recognizes
the problem posed by 2 Timothy
2:12, but offers no
suggested answer: "The difficulty about this view
is 2 Ti 212 ei] a]parnhso<meqa,
where the condition was surely conceived
as no more than
hypothetical."3
1 Turner, Syntax, p. 319.
2 Ibid., p. 115.
3 Ibid.,
p. 115.
64
Turner notes that in the third group of conditional
sentences,
the "unreal"
conditions, the past tenses are used and retain their
proper Aktionsart. Thus the imperfect stands
for "what should be now"
and the aorist for
"what should have been."1
In both cases, reality is
not found in what the
speaker wants it to be or to have been.
His discussion of the fourth group of conditions (protasis
=
e]a<n
with the subjunctive) includes the concept of particular and
general as defined by
the Aktionsart (as he understands it)
of the
verbs employed:
(1) Present: very common in Koine. In a general and iterative
sense, as "condicio universalis"
. . . , the pres. subj. denotes a
hypothesis which can occur over and over
again (present Aktionsart).
The most common example of this condition
in the Ptol. Pap. is
stereotyped phrases in decrees and
punishments, having a continual
validity.
(2)
Aorist: This represents a definite event as occurring
only once in the future, and conceived as
taking place before the
time of the action of the main verb. It
is expectation, but not
fulfillment as yet.2
Here he evidences the
common, though erroneous, view of the significance
of the aorist tense.
Further, he does not make the concept of particular
and general a basis of
classification, only of interpretation.
Not all conditional sentences fit neatly into this
four-group
package, and Turner
speaks of "a liberal mixing in the various categories
of conditional
sentences."3 The specifics remain to be explored, but
1 Turner, Syntax, p. 91.
2 Ibid., p. 114.
3 Ibid.,
p. 319.
65
it would seem, as with
Moule, that any system that produces such
results needs to be
reexamined.
H. E. Dana and Julius
R. Mantey
The appearance of Dana and Mantey's Manual Grammar probably
accounted for the
disappearance of Robertson's Shorter
Grammar of the
Greek
New Testament as a standard intermediate text.1
In their book
these authors summarize
Robertson's analysis and add some interesting
terminology and
explanations of their own.
Statement of Their
Position
The basis upon which they classify conditional sentences is
"the attitude that
they express with reference to reality."2 This is
expressed through the
mood of the protasis. The indicative points to
a condition from the
viewpoint of reality. The subjunctive and
optative moods point to
a condition from the viewpoint of probability.3
Those conditions which
use the indicative mood are divided into
two sub-classes. The
first, termed the "simple condition," presents
"one fact as
conditioning another." In this form "nothing is implied
as to whether or not
this fact actually exists."4 The second sub-class
1 Now available as a
reprint: A. T. Robertson and W. Hersey Davis,
A New Short
Grammar of the Greek Testament, 10th edition (
Baker
Book House, 1977).
2 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 287.
3 Ibid., p. 287.
4 Ibid.,
p. 287.
66
implies that "this
fact has not been realized, and therefore does not
exist. This we call the
contrary to fact condition."1
These two types,
then,
. . . assume that the premise is either
true or untrue. The speaker
takes for granted that which he assumes is
true, as in the simple
condition; or that it is known not to be
true, as is the case in the
contrary to fact condition. The
indicative, being the mood for
reality, is regularly used in this type of
sentence.2
Using Matthew 12:27 as
a test case, it is clear that their first state-
ment (The condition
implies nothing about the actual facts of the case.)
is more accurate than
the second one. Jesus did take His assumed link
with Beelzebub for
granted, but only for the sake of the argument.
Conditions utilizing the subjunctive mood are termed the
"more
probable future
conditions," and those with the optative are the "less
probable future
conditions."3 All of these conditions utilize the
particle a@n whether by itself or
in combination with ei]
(ei] + a@n =
e]a<n).4
Evaluation of Their Position
Their observations on the construction of the four types of
conditional sentences
are identical to Robertson's. They identify three
types of irregular
forms of conditional sentences: (1) mixed conditions,
1 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 287.
2 Ibid., p. 288.
3 Ibid., p. 287.
4 Ibid.,
p. 288.
67
(2) implied conditions
"in which the apodosis is expressed and the protasis
implied in a participle
(I Tim. 4:4), imperative (Mk. 1:17), or question
(Mt. 26:15)," and
elliptical conditions.1
Although their terminology is somewhat different than that
of
Robertson, the
closeness of their position to his places them under
the same evaluation.
Robert W. Funk
As Professor of Religious Studies at the
Robert W. Funk has not
only translated and enlarged the standard
grammar of
Blass-Debrunner, but has produced one of his own. His
discussion of
conditional sentences reflects the basic system of
Robertson, but with
significant comparisons to Classical grammars,
especially the work of
Smyth.
Statement of His
Position
The first class condition presents "a simple
conditional
assumption with
emphasis on the reality of the assumption (but not on
the reality of what is
being assumed)."2 This is the same statement he
used in his revision of
Blass-Debrunner, and the same clarification is
necessary. By
"assumption" he means the statement of the situation,
and by "what is
being assumed" he means the situation itself. The use
of the future tense in
both the protasis and apodosis is the equivalent
1 Dana and Mantey, Grammar, p. 291.
2 Funk, Grammar,
II, p. 680.
68
of Smyth's "future
most vivid" condition, but Funk recognizes it as a
special form of the
first class condition.1
His analysis of the second class is the same as Robertson.
The
third class of
conditions utilizes the subjunctive mood in the protasis
and is called "a
probable case."2 The use
of the present tense in the
apodosis "often
gives the condition a generalizing force (indicated
by event in the
translation)."3 This is
what Smyth termed the "future
more vivid"
condition.
Evaluation of His
Position
Funk demonstrates the advantages of classification by
reality
as expressed in the
mood of the protasis. He is able to present a
simple, easily
comprehended, system and account for the many subspecies
recognized by other
grammarians. His improvement upon Robertson's
system is more in terms
of organization than content.
William Sanford La Sor
William Sanford La Sor is more familiar to scholars for his
work
in Hebrew rather than
Greek, for he is Professor of Old Testament at
Fuller Theological
Seminary. He has, however, published a two-volume
handbook of Greek
grammar based on an inductive study of Acts. In this
work he follows a
system unique to modern Koine grammarians: that of
1 Funk, Grammar, II, p. 684.
2 Ibid., p. 683.
3 Ibid.,
p. 683.
69
Goodwin.
Statement of His
Position
The outline of his position is almost identical to that of
Goodwin:
Simple Condition,
Protasis = ei]
+ indicative
Apodosis = indicative or equivalent
Unreal Condition
Protasis = ei]
+ past indicative
Apodosis = (a@n)
+ past indicative
Present General Condition
Protasis = e]a<n + subjunctive
Apodosis = present indicative
More
Vivid Future Condition
Protasis = e]a<n + subjunctive/other
Apodosis = future indicative
Less Vivid Future Condition
Protasis = ei] +
optative
Apodosis = a@n
+ optativel
This classification is based upon time and reality, as was
that of Goodwin. La Sor
states that:
Present conditions can be only
noncommittal or general . .
Past conditions can be noncommittal or
contrary to fact . . . .
Future conditions can be only probable.
But the degree of probability
in the speaker's mind is variable. There
is a more probable (or
"more vivid") future condition.
. . and a less probable (or "less
vivid") future condition . . . .2
He offers some interesting comments on the various types of
conditions. For
example, he says that the simple condition [obviously]
1 William Sanford La Sor, Handbook of New Testament Greek, 2
volumes
(Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1973), II,
p..
225.
2 Ibid.,
p. 222.
70
may refer to past time
by using a past tense in the protasis. This
form is very similar to
that of the unreal condition, which also uses
a past (augmented)
tense in the protasis. Further, he notes that the
regular negative
particle for the protases of past simple conditions
is mh<, even with the
indicative tense: "Where ou]
is used, it probably
negates a word in the
protasis and not the entire protasis."1 He also
identifies mh< as the negative
particle of unreal conditions, "even though
it [the verb] is
indicative."2
Evaluation of His
Position
La Sor evidences the same problem that Goodwin does in his
analysis:
classification more by interpretation than by form. He notes,
for example, that the
present general condition, which uses e]a<n
and the
subjunctive mood, is
often "close to, if not identical with the simple
condition . . . except
for the use of e]a<n + sbjtv. [sic]"3
The more vivid future condition "is expressed by using
say in
the protasis, generally
with the subjunctive, and a future indicative or
equivalent in the apodosis."4
La Sor then remarks that "there is
considerable variation
in the protasis of this type of condition: and
offers these examples:
1 La Sor, Grammar, II, p. 223.
2 Ibid., p. 224.
3 Ibid., p. 224.
4 Ibid., p. 224.
71
With ei] + subjtv: Lk.
9:13; I Cor. 14:5.
With ei] or e]a<n + fut. ind.: Ac. 8:31; 2 Tim. 2:12.
With ei]
+ pres. ind.: Matt. 8:31; I Cor. 10:27.1
Again, it would seem
that interpretation more than form is the guiding
principle of
classification. The specific verses will be analyzed in
the following sections
of this study. La Sor's position will have to
be carefully evaluated,
for he represents a unique position among
modern Koine
grammarians.
Summary of Koine
Grammarians
The twelve Koine grammarians discussed in this section may
be
classified into two
groups: (1) those who do not follow Robertson: Moule
and La Sor, and (2)
those who do: all the rest. The first group pursues
either their own
approach, such as Moule, or follow most Classical
grammarians, as La Sor
does. They are a decided minority among Koine
grammarians, both early
and modern.
The second group follows the system presented by Robertson
in
Koine studies and
Gildersleeve in Classical grammar. These classify
conditional sentences
according to the reality of the condition as
expressed by the mood
of the protasis. The first group basically follows
the time of the
condition as the principle of classification.
The relation of the condition to reality is either actual
or
potential. The moods
utilized in the protasis indicate these relation-
ships: indicative =
actual, subjunctive or optative = potential. The
1 La Sor, Grammar,
II, p. 224.
72
first group of
conditions, those using the indicative mood, may be real
or unreal. The speaker
may assume that the condition is a real condition,
or he may assume that
it is not. In either case the indicative mood is
used, and in both cases
the reality is limited to the statement, not
the situation. The
second group, those conditions presented as
potential, involve two
degrees of potentiality. Here the grammarians
struggle with
terminology. Dana and Mantey are the least ambiguous with
their terms "more
probable" and "less probable." The degrees of
probability are
indicated by the subjunctive and optative moods,
respectively.
CHAPTER
II
THE SIMPLE
CONDITION
A survey of the various grammarians and their attempts to
classify conditional
sentences is helpful, but not determinative. Only
an inductive analysis
of the New Testament examples can offer definitive
evidence for one system
over another. Such an inductive study is the
goal of the next four
chapters.
Introduction
The following steps were taken to achieve this goal: (1)
All
conditional sentences
were identified and entered on index cards. This
was accomplished by
looking at every reference containing a conditional
particle as listed in Englishman’s Greek Concordance. Each
card showed
the protasis, apodosis
and verb parsings of every condition. Supplied
verbs were entered
based upon context and reference to the New
American
Standard
Bible.
(2) This information was then entered on punch cards for
ease
in mechanical sorting.
The cards were then sorted into the various groups
as indicated in the
following chapters. This arrangement also facilitated
rapid cross-checking of
the various types of conditions.
(3) The information on each punch card was again verified
from
the Greek New Testament
and the lists were prepared. There are no
complete listings of
all conditional sentences in the New Testament.
73
74
Robertson offers a
full, albeit incomplete listing in the Appendix of his
grammar,1
and J. W. Roberts has even more extensive lists in his disser-
tation.2 After the author had completed his lists, he
compared them
to Robertson and
Roberts and made the necessary adjustments. Since
Roberts' were more
complete, they were usually consulted. Careful
study showed that while
they were extensive, they were not perfect. The
results, it is hoped,
will be even more extensive.
It is readily acknowledged that these lists are not perfect.
Many apodosis verbs
have to be supplied from the context, and honest
differences of opinion
exist as to what tense and mood is to be
inserted. Also, in a
study of this magnitude, omissions and errors
are possible, although
every effort has been made to keep such to a
minimum. Individual
questions about specific conditions, though, will
not affect the general
picture that emerges from the data, and this is
the desired goal.
In order to avoid problems with certain incorrect
implications
drawn from A. T.
Robertson's terminology and its inadequacies, the
"neutral"
terminology of Dana and Mantey will be employed. Again, their
definition of a simple
condition:
1 A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the
Light of
Historical Research
pp.
1416-1419.
2 J. W. Roberts, "The
Use of Conditional Sentences in the Greek
New
Testament as Compared with Homeric, Classical and Helenistic Uses,"
unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, the
75
This condition was used when one wished to
assume or to seem to
assume the reality of his premise. Ei]
occurs regularly in the
protasis, with any tense of the
indicative. There is no fixed
form for the apodosis--any mood or tense
may occur.1
Appendix I lists the occurrences of the simple condition,
and
verifies their
observation: most moods and tenses do appear. The summary
of these occurrences
is:
Protasis using ei]
with the present indicative . . 221
examples
Protasis using ei]
with the aorist indicative. . . 56
examples
Protasis using ei]
with the future indicative. . . 22
examples
Protasis using ei]
with the perfect indicative . . 12 examples
311
examples
The Conditional
Particle Ei]
The discussion of the simple condition begins with a brief
analysis of its
components. Taking them in order of appearance, the
first subject is the
condition particle ei].
The
Significance of Ei]
When used by itself, ei]
may be several things, including
(1) a conditional
particle, (2) a type of aposiopesis (a sudden breaking
off of what is stated),
especially as a replacement for the Hebrew Mxi
and (3) an
interrogative particle.2
1 H. E. Dana and Julius R.
Mantey, A Manual Grammar of the Greek
New Testament (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1966), p. 289.
2 William F. Arndt and F.
Wilbur Gingrich, A Greek-English
Lexicon of the
New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature,
second
edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 219-
220.
76
As a Conditional
Particle
Ei]
regularly appears with the indicative mood to indicate the
simple condition. It
also occurs with the subjunctive mood in Luke 9:13;
Romans 11:14; I
Corinthians 9:11 (T.R.), 14:15; Philippians 3:11,12;
I Thessalonians 5:10;
and Revelation 11:5. Since the mood of the
verb determines the
type of condition, not the particle employed,
these specific passages
are discussed in the next chapter. Ei] also
appears with the
optative in the less probable future conditions.
As an Interrogative
Particle
Not all occurrences of ei]
mark conditional sentences, for it is
used to indicate
questions, especially indirect ones. Robertson notes
that its use with direct
questions is close to an elliptical condition
and suggests Mark 15:44
and Luke 23:6 as examples.1 This is parallel
with its use in marking
out direct quotes, frequently serving as
quote marks in English
(e.g. Matthew 12:10). Robertson further
suggests that this use
may be due to the fact that the Septuagint
utilizes ei] at times to translate
the h-interrogative, as here
in
Matthew 12:10.2 This usage is a change from the usual
Classical use of
ei].
One cannot automatically think "conditional sentence" whenever
he observes this
particle in the text.
1 A. T. Robertson, Grammar, p. 916.
2 Ibid.,
p. 916.
77
In Aposiopesis
A third important use of ei] is in aposiopesis,
. . . the sudden breaking off of what is
being said (or written),
so
that the mind may be more impressed by what is too wonderful,
or solemn, or awful for words: or when a
thing may be, as we some-
times say, "better imagined than
described."1
In this construction,
the protasis is stated and the writer drops the
sentence, letting the
reader draw his conclusion, as in Luke 19:42.
A related use is to
translate the Hebrew particle Mxi.
This is a
recognized Hebraism and
is not a conditional sentence.
Ei]
does have a number of uses, but the most important one is
that of the conditional
particle. Before pursuing its most common
use, brief mention
should be made of its appearances in combination with
other particles.
The Significance of Ei] with Other Particles
Ei]
a]ra<
There are only two New Testament examples of ei] a@ra: Mark 11:13
and Acts 8:22. This
combination emphasizes the assumption: "When placed
after pronouns and
interrogative particles, it refers to a preceding
assertion or fact, or
even to something existing only in the
mind . . . ."2 Acts 8:22 (deh<qhti tou? kuri<ou ei] a@ra a]feqh<setai< soi)
1 E. W. Bullinger, Figures of Speech Used in the Bible
(Grand
Rapids:
Baker Book House, 1968 reprint of 1898 edition), p. 154.
2 Joseph Henry Thayer, Thayer's Greek-English Lexicon of the New
Testament, reprint of
Corrected Edition (
National Foundation for
Christian Education, n.d.), p. 71.
78
is translated by Thayer
as "If, since thy sin is so grievous, perhaps
the thought etc."1
This usage is similar to ei] pw?j, as will be
seen
below.
Ei]pe<r
Six undisputed examples of ei]pe<r are found in the New Testament:
Romans 8:9,17; I
Corinthians 8:5, 15:15; 2 Thessalonians 1:6 and
I Peter 2:3. I 2 Corinthians 5:3 B, D. E. and G support ei]pe<r.
Ei] ge< is
the accepted reading,
supported by x,
C, K, L and P.2 This
combination
emphasizes the concept
under discussion: the particle per
means "to do
a thing to the limit
(beyond), thoroughly."3 Suggested
translations of
ei]pe<r
include "if indeed, if after all, since."4 Use of this particle
combination emphasizes
the veracity of the condition being discussed.
Interestingly, only
Paul employs this construction.
Ei]
ge<
The combination of ei]
ge<
is represented by five New Testament
examples: 2 Corinthians
5:3; Galatians 3:4; Ephesians 3:2, 4:21; and
Colossians 1:23. This
combination emphasizes the conditional nature of
1 Thayer, Lexicon, p. 71.
2 W. Robertson Nicoll,
editor, The Expositor’s Greek Testament,
5
volumes (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1967), II, p. 66.
3 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1154.
4 Arndt and Gingrich, Lexicon, p. 219.
79
the thought. Commenting
on ei] ge< kai> ei]kh?
in Galatians 3:4 Lightfoot
remarks:
Ei@
ge<
leaves a loophole for doubt, and kai< widens this,
implying
an unwillingness to believe on the part
of the speaker. Hermann's
distinction . . . that ei@ ge< assumes the truth of a proposition
while ei@per leaves it
doubtful, requires modifying before it is
applied to the New Testament, where ei@per
is, if anything, more
directly affirmative than ei] ge<.1
Arndt and Gingrich suggest "if indeed, inasmuch
as" as possible
translations of this
combination and render Galatians 3:4 as "have you
experienced so many
things in vain? If it really was in vain . . . .”2
The particle ge< performs its
usual emphatic function, strengthening the
word to which it is
attached, and stresses the conditional nature of
the concept.
Ei]
kai<
The combination ei]
kai<
is used to introduce concessive clauses,
and is usually
translated "even if." Robertson represents the majority
opinion when he writes
that concessive clauses "are really just
conditional clauses with the addition of kai<."3
Blass-Debrunner agrees
with this evaluation.4
distinction between
conditional and concessive clauses:
1 J. B. Lightfoot, The Epistle of
(Grand
Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1966 reprint of 1866 edition),
pp.
135-136.
2 Arndt and Gingrich, Lexicon, p. 152.
3 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1026.
4 Friedrich Blass and
Albert Debrunner, A Greek Grammar of the
New Testament
and Other Early Christian Literature, translated and revised
by Robert W. Funk
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 190.
80
The force of a concessive sentence is
thus very different
from that of a conditional sentence. The
latter represents the
fulfillment of the apodosis as
conditioned on the fulfillment of
the protasis; the former represents the
apodosis as fulfilled in
spite of the fulfillment of the protasis.1
He does recognize, though, that there are times when the
two
clauses become almost
identical:
Yet there are cases in which by the
weakening of the character-
istic force of each construction, or by
the complexity of the
elements expressed by the protasis, the
two usages approach so
near to each other as to make distinction
between them difficult.2
Few Koine grammarians follow
purposes of
classification, concessive clauses were omitted from the
lists of conditional
sentences in the appendices. Including them would,
of course, alter the
total number of examples, but would not affect
the general
conclusions.
Ei]
pw?j
The last particle combination is ei] pw?j. This occurs three
times with the
indicative mood (Romans 1:10, 11:14 and Philippians
3:11), twice with the
subjunctive (Romans 11:14 and Philippians 3:11),
and once with the optative
mood (Acts 27:12). This combination, like
ei]
a@ra,
serves to heighten the question involved. It is uniformly
translated in the
Authorized Version as "if by any means."
While each of these particle combinations has its special
point
of emphasis, it is the
conditional use of ei]
that is the center of
attention. The next
area of discussion will be that of the negative
1 Ernest DeWitt
Testament Greek (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1897), p. 112.
2 Ibid.,
p. 112.
81
particles employed in
the simple condition.
Negative Particles in
Simple Conditions
The topic of negative particles in conditional sentences
shows
how far Koine Greek has
moved from Classical Greek, for the divergence
in form and style is
marked.
The Classical Pattern
W. W. Goodwin will serve as the standard for presenting the
classical pattern of
negative particles in conditional sentences:
The negative particle of the protasis
is regularly mh<, that
of
the apodosis is ou].
When ou] is found in a
protasis, it is generally closely connected
with
a particular word (especially the verb), with which it forms a
single
negative expression; so that its negative force does not (like
that of mh<) affect the
protasis as a whole.1
Though there are, of
course, exceptions, Goodwin's rule states the
general case for the
Classical literature. The Koine situation is
quite different.
The Koine Pattern
Statement.--Alexander Buttmann, an early Koine grammarian,
recognized the
distinction between Koine and Classical Greek on this
point:
The use of ou]
in the protasis of a conditional sentence occurs
in the N.T. relatively very often; so
that we are
1 W. W. Goodwin, Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek
Verb
(Boxton: Ginn and Company, 1893), p. 138.
82
justified in inferring a difference in
usage, since in classical
writers this use is only exceptional.1
A later writer, J. H. Moulton, approvingly quotes Blass's
rule for
the negative particles
in Koine: "'All instances,' he says, 'may
practially he brought
under the single rule, that ou]
negatives the
indicative, mh< the other
moods, including the infinitive and
participle."2
Robertson agrees, noting that "The negative of the
protasis in
the first class
condition is practically always ou]
in the N.T. We have
ei]
ou]
as a rule, not ei]
mh<."3
This rule is not absolute, and he
identifies five
exceptions, listed in the next section. Both he and
Moulton see the simple
absolute rule of ou]
with the indicative and mh
with the other moods as
a goal "not yet reached in the N.T." but almost
completely met in
Modern Greek.4
Specific examples.--The authorities list different
totals for
the various
combinations. Moulton finds thirty-one examples of ei] ou]
in simple condition
protases,5 Robertson thirty-four,6 and Roberts
1 Alexander Buttmann, A
Grammar of the New Testament Greek, trans-
lated
and edited by J. H. Thayer (
1873),
pp. 344-345.
2 J. H. Moulton, Grammar of New Testament Greek. Volume I:
Prolegomena, third edition
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908), p. 170.
3 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1101.
4 Ibid., p. 1101, Moulton, Prolegomena,
p. 170.
5 Moulton, Prolegomena, p. 171.
6 Robertson, Grammar,
p. 1111.
83
thirty-five.1
Whatever the discrepancies, the
preponderance of this form
is clear when compared
to only five examples of ei]
mh<: Mark 6:5,
I Corinthians 15:2, 2
Corinthians 13:5, Galatians 1:7 and I Timothy 6:3.
Of these five, only
Mark 6:5 and I Timothy 6:3 have unanimous acceptance
as examples of the
classical pattern.
Godet considers I Corinthians 15:2 "a pleonasm arising
from the
mixing of the two
following constructions: excepting if (e]kto<j
ei])
and: if not (ei] mh<).2 Lenski agrees with this identification.3
Lightfoot explains Galatians 1:7 so:
Ei]
mh<
seems always to retain, at least in this stage of the
language, its proper exceptive sense, and
is not simply oppositive,
though it frequently approaches nearly to a]lla< . . . .4
This construction
"may either state an exception to the preceding
negative clause (= except, save) or merely qualify it (= but only),
as it does in Luke iv.
26 . . . and in Gal. 1. 7 . . . ."5 The same
basic construction is
found in 2 Corinthians 13:5 – ei]
mh<ti a]doki<moi e@ste.
The ratio of five to thirty-five examples gives credence to
Buttmann's claim that
the Koine shows a wide divergence from the
Classical usage in the
negative particles in the simple condition. The
presence of a
relatively few examples of mh<
show that the Classical
heritage has not been
completely lost in the New Testament.
1 Roberts,
"Conditional Sentences," p. 153.
2
3 Lenski, Corinthians, p. 629.
4 Lightfoot, Galatians, p. 77.
5 Nicoll, Testament,
III, p. 156.
84
]Ea<n
with the Indicative Mood
Although, the general principle of simple conditions is
that the
protasis consists of ei] with the indicative
mood, there are exceptions.
A few such conditions
employ ean with the indicative in
an apparent
contradiction to this
principle: Mark 8:3; Luke 19:40; John 8:54,
21:22,23; Acts 8:31; I
Thessalonians 3:8; I John 5:15 and Revelation
2:22.
Explanation of the
Form
While these nine exceptions are a small percentage of the
total,
they are a phenomenon
that needs explanation. Several explanations may
be offered.
Development of the
Language
First of all, Koine Greek represents a stage in the
historical
development of the
language. As the language progressed from Classical
through Koine to
Modern, the distinction between ei]
and
e]a<n faded,
especially in respect
to their respective moods. In the later Koine
"the use of e]a<n with the ind.
is rather more frequent . . .
Finally
ei]
came
to be 'a mere literary alternative.'"1 Blass-Debrunner also
recognizes this
consequence of linguistic development.2
The New
Testament, therefore,
represents a period in which the general principle
is operative, but a
transition is evident. Robertson summarizes: "In
general, the difference
between ei] and e]a<n is considerably
lessened
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1009.
2 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar, p. 190.
85
in the koinh<, though it must
be remembered that e]a<n
was never confined
to the subj. nor ei] to the ind. and
opt."1
Textual Emendations
While the development of the language may be one
consideration
in explaining these
apparent exceptions, textual emendations are
another. Buttmann
raises this observation and caution:
It is, indeed, not to be denied that
the instances in question
almost disappear amid the multitude of
those that are grammatically
regular, and suspicion may also be raised
by the circumstances
that hardly a single passage with the
Indicative is completely
beyond question critically. Yet when we
consider that in countless
passages with the Subjunctive not the
smallest variation is found
(which would not be the case if the
Indicative were chargeable solely
to the copyists), it is far more probable
that, where a diversity
of readings occurs in such a number of
instances, this fact results
from the circumstance that the copyists,
commentators, etc., early
altered the Indicative which gave them
offence.2
Winer also notes the significance of textual variations in
his comments on the
subject.3 Both grammarians,
however, recognize the
legitimate
identification of e]a<n
with the indicative in the New Testa-
ment in spite of the
fact that most of the examples show textual
variants.
How wide-spread is this textual difficulty? A review of the
available evidence
supports the claim of Buttmann: such constructions
1 Robertson, Grammar, pp. 1009-1010.
2 Buttmann, Grammar, p. 222.
3 G. B. Winer, A Grammar of the Idiom of the New Testament,
seventh
edition, revised by Gottfried Lunemann, translated by J. H.
Thayer (Andover: Warren
F. Draper, Publisher, 1893), p. 294.
86
are part of the original
text. Robertson discusses several passages which
have been challenged,1
and Roberts lists the textual evidence for
some of them and adds a
few examples of his own.2
Thus two things seem to be born out: (1) there has been
some
alteration of the text in
apparent attempts to bring specific passages
into conformity with
the general rule and (2) e]a<n
was used with the
indicative mood in some
passages of the original text of the New
Testament.3
Significance
of the Form
If the use of e]a<n
with the indicative is part of the original
text, then what is its
significance? Specific answers vary: Robertson,
of course, sees no
special significance. The key for him is the mood,
not the particle.
Therefore he sees no basic difference between the
two types of protases,
for each uses the indicative mood.4
Both
represent simple
conditions.
dogmatically:
In a few instances say is used with
the Present Indicative in
the protasis of a conditional sentence,
apparently to express a
simple present supposition. I Thess. 3:8,
I John 5:15.5
1 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1010.
2 Roberts, "Conditional Sentences," pp. 146-149.
3
Moulton, Prolegomena, p. 168.
4
Robertson, Grammar, p. 1007.
5 Burton, Syntax, p. 103.
87
Blass-Debrunner offer no comment either
way.1
Roberts approaches the subject from the historical side and
discusses the use of e]a<n in conditional
sentences in the Septuagint.
In this section of his
dissertation he relies upon the work of James
Sterenberg who wrote a
dissertation for the
1908 entitled "The
Use of Conditional Sentences in the Alexandrian
Version of the
Pentateuch." This work was not
available to the author,
so Roberts' conclusions
will have to be accepted at face value:
It will be remembered that Sterenberg
noted that the construction
is used in the LXX (where it occurs with
the perfect, present,
imperfect, and the aorist indicatives)
mostly in laws in the protases
of which transgressions and the like are
minutely defined and that it
is used to render the original thought
more exactly to avoid
ambiguity; e.g., where the verb in the
protasis is thought to
precede in time the event or the
immediately preceding verb, or in
one verb when the event may be supposed as
a possible event,
requiring the indicative, but where both
verbs are governed by e]a<n.2
This, though, is the sense of the construction in the
Septuagint.
New Testament examples
are not, as Roberts notes, "so related to laws."3
It would seem that the
observations based upon the Septuagint do not
fit the New Testament
examples.
Neither do the commentators offer much help. Lenski
identifies
the ean of I Thessalonians 3:8
as "looking to the future."4 Lightfoot,
1 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar, p. 190.
2 Roberts,
"Conditional Sentences," p. 149.
3 Ibid., p. 149.
4 R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of
the Corinthians
to the Thessalonians, to Timothy, to Titus and to
Philemon
(Minneapolis:
Augsburg Publishing House, 1961), p. 291.
88
after defending the
indicative in the same verse, equates doubt with
the particle:
fast.'
Their faith was not complete (ver. 10). There was enough
in the fact that they had been so
recently converted, enough in
the turn which their thoughts had
recently taken, absorbed so
entirely in the contemplation of the future
state, to make the
Apostle alarmed lest their faith should
prove only impulsive and
transitory.1
The
Expositor's Greek Testament notes that the future indicative
in
Revelation 2:22
"expresses rather more probability than the subj. with
e]a<n
mh<.”2
What, then, can be said about a distinction in meaning
between
e]a<n
with the indicative and ei]
with the indicative? Nothing, really.
There are too few
examples upon which to build rules, and the distinction,
if any, is nebulous at
best. Roberts accurately states the case: "This
writer is able to
discover no distinction which can be put in a rule."3
Neither is this one.
Significance of
Moods and Tenses
Since the deciding factor in identifying a simple condition
is the indicative mood
in the protasis and not the conditional particle,
the next step in
discussing the simple condition is to evaluate the
significance of the
various moods and tenses in the protasis and apodosis.
1 J. B. Lightfoot, Notes on the Epistles of
Zondervan
Publishing House, 1957 reprint of 1895 edition), p. 46.
2 Nicoll, Testament, V, p. 361.
3 Roberts, "Conditional Sentences," p.
150.
89
Moods and Tenses in
the Protasis
General Observations
The simple condition is, by definition, limited to the
indicative mood, for it
assumes the reality of the condition. The
particle e]a<n does occur, but
the key is the mood. A few examples of ei]
with the subjunctive
mood are found in the New Testament, but these are
identified as more
probable conditions and discussed under that
heading. The simple
condition is limited to the indicative mood in the
protasis.
This mood may be used with any tense. The specific data for
New Testament tense
usage is listed below:
Present tense =
69.0%
Aorist tense =
17.5%
Future tense =
6.9%
Perfect tense =
3.8%
Each of these tenses
brings with it the usual verbal significance as
described in the
grammars. Which one is used in a given condition
depends upon the action
involved in the protasis.
While there is no rule governing the type of tense used in
any
given protasis except
the desire of the author, it is clear that the
present tense is used
far more than all others combined.
Future Indicative
One particular combination calls for specific discussion: ei]
with the future
indicative. Two things should be noted. First is its
90
use in Classical Greek,
especially by the poets, in threatening or
warning (minatory or
monitory) statements. Second is its use in
emphatic assertions or
oaths.
Minatory or Monitory
Use
Gildersleeve has called attention to this special use of
the
simple condition.
Working within the framework of a comparison between
ei]
and the future indicative and e]a<n
with the subjunctive, he first
notes that the latter
is by far more frequent. The distinction between
the two is seen
. . . whenever it is important to
distinguish continued from
concentrated action, whenever it is
important to distinguish over-
lapping from priority, e]a<n with the
subjunctive is preferred.
He continues,
Now the neglect of this distinction in ei]
with the future
indicative shows a certain coldness, a
certain indifference; and
this added to the general rigor of the
logical condition, which
faces fact in all its grimness, gives a
stern, minatory, prophetic
tone to the future indicative, which
commentators and grammarians
have noticed, but noticed only in passing
. . . .2
Gildersleeve then proceeds to illustrate this from the
tragic
poets, showing that the
device is frequently employed by them in such
settings.
The New Testament, though, stands in contrast to the tragic
poets of Classical
Greek, for there is only one example of this
1 B. L. Gildersleeve,
"On ei] with the Future Indicative and ean
with
the Subjunctive in the Tragic Poets," Transactions
of the American
Philological
Association,
7:1 (January, 1876), p. 9.
2 Ibid.,
p. 9.
91
construction in its
pages.
Of the New Testament instances of ei]
followed by a Future (about
twenty in number), one, 2 Tim. 2:12,
illustrates the minatory or
monitory
force attributed to such clauses by [Gildersleeve].1
The phrase under discussion, ei] a]rnhso<meqa, ka]kei?noj a]rnh<setai,
is the third line of
what may be four lines of an early Christian hymn.2
The fact is stated
"in all its grimness" that "If we shall deny Him,
He also will deny
us." Certainly this must be understood as a stern
warning, for eternity
seems to hang in the balance. But, it should be
asked, a warning of
what to whom?
Commentators are, as usual, divided on the passage. Some
seem
to imply loss of
salvation resulting from a believer's turning against
his Lord and denying
Him. Hendriksen's words seem to allow for this:
When a person, because of unwillingness to
suffer hardship for
the sake of Christ and his cause, disowns the Lord ("I do not know
the man!"), then, unless he repents, he will be disowned by the
Lord in the great day of judgment ("I
do not know you.").3
general and, assuming
that some may prove their true colors by denying
Him, warns them of
their fate.4 Hiebert agrees
with
the idea that this
denial refers to "a temporary weakness of faith," but
1
2 Homer A. Kent, Jr., The Pastoral Epistles (
1958),
p. 271.
3 William Hendriksen, 1 - II Timothy and Titus (
Baker
Book House, 1965), p. 259.
4 Kent, Pastoral
Epistles, p. 272.
92
as the conclusion
shows, to deny Him "as a permanent fact."1
Certainly, though, Gildersleeve's identification of this
construction as one
presenting grim fact in a coldly logical way aptly
describes Paul's words.
Emphatic Assertions
The second and more common use of ei] with the future
indicative
is in emphatic
assertions or oaths. This is especially true in quotes
from the Old Testament
where ei] translates the Hebrew
particle Mxi.
The
four examples of this
are Mark 8:12, Hebrews 3:11, 4:3 and 4:5.
Mark 8:12, ei] doqh<setai th? genea? tau<th
shmei?on,
is not an
"official"
oath like the examples in Hebrews, but it fits the same
pattern: "No sign shall be given to this
generation." As already
indicated, Robertson
identifies this as an elliptical condition lacking
the apodosis. Further,
he says that this is "really aposiopesis in
imitation of the Hebrew
use of im."2 Other grammarians recognize this
construction, including
Winer,3 Buttmann,4 and Blass-Debrunner.5
1 D. Edmund Hiebert, Second Timothy (Chicago: Moody Press,
1958),
pp.
63-64.
2 Robertson, Word Pictures, IV, p. 331.
3 Winer, Grammar, p. 500.
4 Buttmann, Grammar, pp. 358-359.
5 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar, p. 189.
94
The references in Hebrews (3:11, 4:3 and 4:5) are all
quotations
from the Septuagint
version of Psalm 95:11 – ei]
ei]seleu<sontai ei]j th>n
kata<pausi<n
mou.
The Hebrew version introduces this with the particle
Mxi,
whose use in oaths is a normal structure of the language.1 The
Septuagint regularly
uses ei] in these situations.
The Authorized
Version correctly
renders 3:11 as "They shall not enter into my rest,"
while 4:3 and 4:5 are
translated, "If they shall enter into my rest."
Modern versions
correctly translate all of them the same way: a statement
of warning, "They
shall not enter into my rest."
Thus ei] with the indicative is
used in sentences of emphatic
negation, though few of
them are found in the New Testament. The
conditional particle is
a straight-forward translation of the Hebrew
and is a proper
Hebraism.
Moods and Tenses in
the Apodosis
There is no specific relationship between the moods and tenses
of the protasis and the
apodosis in simple conditions. Robertson
summarizes this point
well when he states:
The apodosis varies very greatly. It all
depends upon what one is
after, whether mere statement,
prediction, command, prohibition,
suggestion, question. Hence the apodosis
may be in the indicative
(any tense) or the subjunctive or the
imperative. There is no
necessary correspondence in tense between
protasis and apodosis.
The variation in the mode of the apodosis
has no essential bearing
on the force of the condition.2
1 E. Kautzsch, ed., Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar, revised by A.
E.
Cowley
(London: Oxford University Press, 1910), pp. 471-472.
2 Robertson, Grammar,
p. 1008.
95
While there is no essential correspondence between the
protasis
and the apodosis, there
is a preference for the indicative mood in
the apodosis. The
tables in Appendix I yield the following data:
Apodoses with indicative mood = 205 or 67.3% of the total.
Apodoses with imperative mood = 84 or 28.4% of the total.
Apodoses with subjunctive mood = 7 or 2.4% of the total.
Again, no rule may be
fixed, but the distribution is most reasonable.
Protases which speak in
real terms would normally imply apodoses which
also speak in real
terms. But language is flexible, and all moods are
possible and do occur.
Meaning of the
Simple Condition
Now that the details of amount and construction have been
considered, the way is
cleared for a consideration of the basic meaning
of the simple
condition. This will cover two areas: (1) particular
and general conditions,
and (2) the degree of reality implied by the
protasis.
Particular and General
Conditions
The terminology if not the concept of particular and
general
conditions has entered
Koine studies through the work of Goodwin, hence
his definitions will be
the starting point.
The Position of Goodwin
Goodwin defines particular and general thusly:
A particular supposition refers to a
definite act or to several
definite acts, supposed to occur at some
definite time (or
times) . . . .
96
A general supposition refers
indefinitely to any act or acts
of a given class which may be supposed to
occur or to have occurred
at any time . . .1
This particular
distinction is seen "in all classes of conditions,"
but in some of them it
may be distinguished by construction:
When the apodosis has a verb of
present time expressing a
customary or repeated action, the
protasis may refer (in a general
way) to any act or acts of a given class
which may be supposed to
occur at any time within the period
represented in English as
present.
When the apodosis has a verb of past time
expressing a customary
or repeated action, the protasis may refer
(in a general way) to any
act or acts of a given class which may be
supposed to have occurred
at any time in the past.2
The key point in the construction of the conditional
sentence
is the tense of the
apodosis, not the protasis. Goodwin is simply
attributing to the
present and imperfect tenses their continual or
repetitive
significance.
The Evaluation of
Goodwin
As mentioned earlier, Funk has also noted that "The present
tense in the apodosis
often gives the condition a generalizing force
(indicated by ever in the translation)."3
Funk, though, simply notes it
as an observation
without making it a rule of classification. In this
he follows
Gildersleeve, who notes that all classes of conditional
sentences may be either
general or particular, "according to the
1 W. W. Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, p. 141.
2 Ibid., pp. 141-142.
3 Robert W. Funk, A Beginning-Intermediate Grammar of
Hellenistic
Greek, 3 volumes (
1973), II, p. 683.
97
character of the
apodosis."1
Robertson rejects Goodwin's use of this concept as a means
of
classification:
This theory calls for
"particular" and "general" suppositions as a
fundamental element. This is a false step
in itself. As Gilder-
sleeve shows, each of the four classes of
conditions may be parti-
cular or general. That point has no
bearing on the quality of the
condition.2
Does this agree with the facts of the case? Can simple
conditional sentences
be particular or general, depending upon the
context as Gildersleeve
and Robertson maintain? The answer, of course,
is Yes. A few examples
will suffice.
Romans 4:14 uses two perfect tenses in the apodosis of its
condition and speaks of
one past historical event: the giving of the
law – ei] ga>r oi[ e]k no<mou
klhrono<moi, keke<nwtai h@ pi<stij.- "for if those
who are of law are
heirs, then faith has no value." This fits the
pattern of Goodwin as a
particular condition.
I Corinthians 15:2, however, uses a present tense in the
apodosis
and speaks of the
specific situation of the Corinthian believers and
their relationship to
the gospel – di ] ou$ kai>
sw<zesqe, ti<ni lo<gw
eu]hggelisa<mhn
u[mi<n ei] kate<xete - "By this (gospel) you are
saved, if you
hold fast to the word I
preached to you." This does not agree with
Goodwin, for the
present tense (sw<zesqe)
should make this condition
a general one.
1 B. L. Gildersleeve,
"Studies in Pindaric Syntax," The
American
Journal
Philology,
3:4 (December, 1882), p. 435.
2 Robertson, Grammar,
pp. 1005-1006.
98
Matthew 12:26 – kai>
ei] o[ stana?j to>n satana?n e]kba<llei, e]f ]
e[auto<n
e]meri<sqh - "And if Satan casts out Satan, he is divided
against
himself" - may be
taken as a general condition, referring to any time
Satan works against
himself. Yet the apodosis uses the aorist e]merisqh,
contrary to what
Goodwin would predict.
Thus the simple condition may be either particular or
general
with no special
significance attached to the tense of the apodosis.
Funk's point should not
be overlooked, though, for the concepts of
particular and general
are a legitimate part of interpretation and
translation.
Degree of Reality
One of the most important questions about simple conditions
is:
What do they imply
about the condition they state? The indicative mood
communicates objective
reality, but how is that communicated and
wherein does the reality
lie?
Review of the
Grammarians
The various grammarians approach this question in various
ways,
but most have arrived
at a similar position.
Classical Grammarians
Goodwin stated his opinion that simple conditions are those
which
imply nothing as to the
fulfillment [reality] of the condition . . ,”1
He rejects the idea
that language should even have a form which implied
1 Goodwin, Moods
and Tenses, p. 139.
99
the objective reality
of a condition: "The Greek has no form implying
that a condition is or was fulfilled, and it is
hardly conceivable that
any language should
find such a form necessary or useful."1
Gildersleeve agrees with Goodwin:
The Logical Condition [simple
condition] states the elements in
question. It is used of that which can be
brought to the standard
of fact; but that standard may be for or
against the truth of the
postulate. All that the logical condition
asserts is the inexorable
connection of the two members of the
sentence.2
His point is that the
factuality of the postulate is limited to its
statement, for it is
presented as something that can be considered as
fact but not
necessarily is fact. The Classical grammarians are in
agreement on this
point.
Koine Grammarians
Early Koine grammarians followed this approach. Green
states,
"The conditional
particle ei],
if with the Indicative in the
protasis,
assumes the hypothesis
as a fact."3 Winer
reflects Gildersleeve's view
by identifying the
simple condition as the "Pure Condition."4 Even
Turner, a more recent
scholar, uses the general language of "simple
assumption."5
1 Goodwin, Mood's and Tenses, p. 140.
2 Gildersleeve, "Pinder," p. 435.
3 Samuel G. Green, Handbook to the Grammar of the Greek
Testament
(London:
The Religious Tract Society, [1886]), p. 317.
4 Winer, Grammar, p . 291.
5 Turner, Syntax,
p. 319.
100
More recent grammarians continue this same general
approach.
Blass-Debrunner states,
somewhat confusingly, "Ei]
with the indicative
of all tenses denotes a
simple conditional assumption with emphasis on
the reality of the
assumption (not of what is being assumed): the
condition is considered
'a real case.'"1 The
confusion results from
the distinction between
the assumption and "what is being assumed."
The assumption
corresponds to the statement, "What is being assumed"
corresponds to the
situation. In Matthew 12:27, Jesus offers the
statement with an
assumption that it is a real case. He assumes it
to be true. He is not,
however, stating the situation as true. The
distinction
Blass-Debrunner draws is between these two: the statement
and the situation.
Dana and Mantey are clearer when they identify the simple
condition as the one
that "was used when one wished to assume or to seem
to assume the reality of
his premise."2 Funk
expands this description:
In
a first class condition the protasis is a simple conditional
assumption with emphasis on the reality of
the assumption (but
not on the reality of what is being
assumed) [reality of statement,
but not the situation]. It is therefore
taken to be a real case
though it may, in fact, be an unreal case
[as in Matthew 12:27].
Robertson's position is basic to this discussion, since he
is
most often quoted in
support of one position or another. To show the
development of his
thought two statements will be given, one from the
1 Blass-Debrunner, Grammar, p. 188.
2 Dana and. Mantey, Grammar, p. 289.
3 Funk, Grammar,
II, p. 680.
101
first and one from the
tenth edition of his Short Grammar:
The indicative states the condition as a fact. It may or may not
be true in fact. The condition has nothing to do with that, but
only with the statement. . . . This condition does assume the
reality of the condition.1
Then, from the tenth
edition:
This condition assumes the reality of the condition. The indicative
mode states
it as a fact. The condition has
nothing whatever to do
with the actual fact or truth. It is just
here that some of the
grammars have erred in failure to
distinguish clearly between the
statement
and the reality. It is the condition
taken at its face
value without any insinuations or
implications. The context, of
course, must determine the actual
situation. The indicative mode
determines only the statement.2
It is evident in the latter statement that he is trying to
avoid
the impression that he
considers the simple condition one that affirms
the reality (or
actuality) of the situation as an objective fact. It
does affirm the reality
of the speaker's assumption or statement, i.e.,
the speaker really
assumes (though he may believe otherwise) that the
condition (statement)
is true. The statements in his Historical
Grammar,
offered in response to Goodwin, are not as clear:
This condition pointedly implies the fulfilment of the condition.
It is the condition of actuality, reality,
Wirklichkeit, and not
mere "possibility" as Farrar has
it . . . a la Goodwin. This is
the crux
of the whole matter. Once see [sic]
that the first class
condition with the ind. implies the
reality of the premise, all
else follows naturally.3
1 A. T. Robertson, A Short Grammar of the Greek New Testament
(New
York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 1908), p. 161.
2 A. T. Robertson and W.
Hersey Davis, A New Short Grammar of
the Greek
Testament
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1933), p. 350.
3 Robertson, Grammar,
p. 1006.
101
It seems, then, that the grammars present a unified view
concerning the degree
of reality in the simple condition: It presents
the statement of the
condition as true, but without affirming any-
thing about the reality
of the actual situation.
Review of the Problem
The unanimous opinion of the grammarians is not reflected
by
some writers and
speakers who claim that the simple condition
guarantees the reality
of the situation. They suggest the translation
"since,"
rather than "if." In English this presents the situation
as true, both in the
speaker's statement and in objective fact. An
extreme, but by no
means isolated example of this has already been
given: "The first
class condition implies truth or reality. If . . .
and
it is true."1 Sometimes Kenneth Wuest is implicated in this
view
on the strength of
translation such as Romans 6:5 -
The Word "if" in the Greek is
not the conditional particle of
an unfulfilled condition. It is a
fulfilled condition here, its
meaning being, "in view of the
fact."2
He did not adopt this
as a uniform principle of translation, though,
and limited such
renderings to places where the context justified them.
This, of course, is at
the heart of the situation. There are several
passages where the
reality of the statement is in keeping with the
reality of the
situation. But many times it is not, e.g. Matthew 12:27.
1 Jerome Moore, "
45:1
(June, 1979), p. 11.
2 Kenneth S. Wuest, Treasures From the Greek New Testament
(Grand Rapids: Wm. B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1957), p. 89.
103
One cannot generalize
from a context where this is true to all uses of
the simple condition.
Objections to this view.--Several objections may be
raised to
this position. First, a
little mature reflection will cause one to be
cautious about agreeing
with Moore and others. In his example he
claims, on the basis of
a simple condition in Colossians 1:23, that
there is no need to
doubt the security of anyone's salvation. This
is not supported from
Scripture, for certainly the false teachers of
Acts 20:30 looked and
acted like believers before their true colors were
flown. Those in I John
2:19 must have looked like believers before
they went out and
demonstrated that they were not. Would Paul have
been so quick to affirm
the absolute salvation of all those in the
church where he had not
visited (Colossians 1:4, 9)? Probably
not.
Second, and more significant, the pattern of translating ei]
by "since"
does not hold in all cases. James Boyer shows that Wuest
changes his translation
between John 10:35 ("since") and 10:37, 38
("assuming
that"), as required by context.1 John Battle has listed all
simple conditions
which, in his opinion, present data in the protasis
that are contrary to
fact and known to be so by the speaker.2 It is
impossible to use
"since" in such verses as I Corinthians 15:13 and
1 James L. Boyer,
"Semantics in Biblical Interpretation,"
Grace Journal, 3:2 (Spring,
1962), p. 33.
2 John A.
Exegesis,"
unpublished Th.D. dissertation, Grace Theological Seminary,
1975, pp. 166-168.
104
still maintain
orthodoxy.
to do is insert
"since" in place of "if" in the verses to realize the
error of this concept.
J. Harold Greenlee shows the variety of
situations one
encounters in the simple condition:
Moreover, 2) the speaker may believe that
the condition is true:
"if they have persecuted me (and they
have done so) [John 15:20a];
or 3) he may believe that the condition is
not true: "if they have
kept my word" (but they have not done
so) [John 15:20b]; or 4) he
may be uncertain as to whether it is true:
"sir, if you have
carried him away" (she does not know
whether he had or not) [John
20:15]; or 5) the speaker may even be
mistaken in his assumption:
"if he is sleeping" (but he was
in fact dead) [John 11:12].1
Justification for the translation of e]i by "since,"
must come
from the context, not
the condition. This is an interpretation,
not a translation.
The correct view.--The simple condition, through the
indicative
mood, offers a
conditional statement presented as real. It makes no
attempt to speak to the
actual situation. If the exegete will maintain
this distinction
between statement and situation, then he will not err
in handling this
condition. A good summary of this point of view is
found in The Bible Translator:
When ei] with the
indicative is used, it implies that the truth or
otherwise of the condition is regarded as
in principle "determined,"
i.e. is represented as a fact (although
the speaker does not commit
himself as to whether he believes the
condition is true or not.2
1 J. Harold Greenlee,
"'If' in the New Testament," The
Bible
Translation, 13:1 (January,
1962), p. 40.
2 John Kinje, Jr., "Greek
Conditional Sentences," The Bible
Translator,
13:4 (October, 1962), p. 223.
105
Translation of the
Simple Condition
How, then, should the simple condition be translated? The
uniform rule of all
grammarians surveyed is to use the English conditional
construction,
"if." All major English versions so translate this
condition. Should one
want to paraphrase the concept, then the phrase,
"If, as I am
assuming . . ." might be employed. The statement of the
simple condition may be
in accord with the reality of the situation,
it may be contrary to
it, or it may be unknown. All that can be said
is that the speaker is
presenting the condition as true in his
statement.
CHAPTER III
THE
CONTRARY TO FACT CONDITION
Introduction
The
Concept
The simple condition states the matter directly by assuming
it
to be true. This, as
has been discussed, is an assumption of reality.
But the assumption can
also work the opposite way. The speaker can
present the situation
and assume it to be false or contrary to fact.
Such a condition is
termed the Contrary to Fact condition and is the
subject of this
chapter.
The
Construction
These conditions follow a standardized construction: ei]
with
a past (augmented)
tense in the indicative mood in the protasis, and
another past
(augmented) verb in the apodosis, usually with a@n. This is
as would be expected,
for both the simple condition and the contrary to
fact condition are
making definite statements; the former assumes them
to be true, the latter
false. Robert W. Funk describes them so:
The assumption is taken to be untrue
in the protasis of a second
class condition [contrary to fact]; it is
considered an unreal case
(whether it is, in fact, is another
matter). The conclusion
follows from the premise.
The protasis consists of ei]
plus a past (augmented) tense of
the indicative; the apodosis also has a
past tense of the indicative,
usually with a@n.1
1 Robert W. Funk, A Beginning-Intermediate Grammar of
Hellenistic
Greek, 3 vols. (
1973), II, p. 681.
106
107
In this format the use
of the imperfect tense in both clauses refers to
present or past time,
and that of the aorist to past time only. This
basic scheme is the
same as that of Robertson,1 Winer,2 and Goodwin.3
Blass-Debrunner
recognizes these general principles, but does not
relate the condition to
time: "The tense (imperfect, aorist, plu-
perfect . . .) retains
its Aktionsart; the imperfect is
temporally
ambiguous."4
List of Contrary to
Fact Conditions
Appendix II gives a Listing of the contrary to fact
conditions
in the New Testament.
There are some apparent exceptions. Buttmann
lists four which he
feels should be classed as contrary to fact condi-
tions even though they
use present tenses: John 8:39, 14:28; Luke 17:6
and Hebrews 11:15. He
calls them exceptions to the rule.5
John 8:39.—ei] te<kna
tou? ]Abraa<m e]ste, ta> e@rga
tou? ]Abqaa<m
poiei?te
(if you were Abraham's children, then you would do the works
1 A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the
Light of
Historical Research
(Nashville: Broadman Press, 1934), p. 1013.
2 G. B. Winer, A Grammar of the Idiom of the New Testament,
7th
edition,
revised by Gottlieb Lunemann, translated by J. H. Thayer
(Andover,
Massachusetts: Warren F. Draper, Publisher, 1893), p. 291.
3 W. W. Goodwin, Syntax of Moods and Tenses (
Company,
1893), p. 147.
4 Friedrich Blass and
Albert Debrunner, A Greek Grammar of the
New Testament
and Other Early Christian Literature, translated and revised
by
Robert W. Funk (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 182.
5 Alexander Buttmann, A Grammar of New Testament Greek,
translated
and
edited by J. H. Thayer (Andover: Warren F. Draper, Publisher, 1873),
pp. 224-225.
108
of Abraham). Buttmann
observes that
Most of the interpreters and editors,
indeed, have taken offence
at this reading [e@ste
in John 8:39], and have adopted into the
text instead the very weakly-attested h@te
(and thus restored the
construction to the ordinary form),
explaining to themselves the
origin of este in various ways . . . .1
Este
is supported by x,
B, D, and L. ]Epoiei?te
is supported by
B, D, E, F, and G.2
Westcott and Hort have present tenses in
both the protasis and
apodosis,3 and the United Bible Societies' text
has the imperfect in
the apodosis.4 The question, then, is not
e@ste
versus h@te, but e]poiei?te
instead of poiei?te.
There seems to be little or no support for Buttmann's claim
that this represents a
contrary to fact condition, for the present
tense in the protasis
affirms Christ's assumption that His listeners
were Abraham's children
. The imperfect indicates that He expresses
doubt as to their
ability to prove it. This is the view of Godet.5
Such an interperetation
makes this a mixed condition. The protasis
is that of a simple
condition, and the apodosis that of a contrary to
fact condition.
1 Buttmann, Grammar., p. 225.
2 W. Robertson Nicoll, ed.,
The Expoisiton'is Greek Testament
(Grand
Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1967), I, p. 778.
3 Brooke Foss Westcott and
Fenton John Anthony Hort, The New
Testament in the
Original Greek
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941),
p.
208.
4 Kurt Aland, et. at.,
eds., The Greek New Testament (
United
Bible Societies, 1966), p. 359.
5
(Grand
Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, n.d., reprint of 1893 edition),
II,
p. 112.
109
John 14:28.—ei]
h]gapa?te me, e]xa<rhte a@n (if you loved me, you would
have rejoiced).
Although Buttmann claims that there is manuscript
evidence for a present
tense in this condition, neither he nor anyone
else gives the data for
it.
Luke 17:6.—ei]
e@xete pi<stin w[j ko<kon sina<pewj, e]le<gete a@n
(if
you had faith as small
as a mustard seed, you could say). Here the
present e@xete is supported by
x, A, B, L, X and
others, while the
imperfect ei@xete shows up in D
and the rest of the Byzantine manuscript
tradition.1 This, like John 8:39, is in reality a mixed
condition.2
Hebrews 11:15.—kai>
ei] me>n e]kei<nhj e]mnhmo<neuon a]f ] h$j e]ce<bhsan
ei#xon
a@n kairo>n a]naka<myai (if they had been remembering the
country they
had left, they would
have had opportunity to return). The only
significant problem is
the presence of mnhmoneu?ousin
in the apodosis
instead of e]mnhmo<neuon.
The evidence for this present tense is so
slight, though, that it
is only mentioned in a footnote in Lange's
Commentary.3 Thus this is taken as a regular contrary to
fact condition.
Buttmann's apparent
exceptions, then, are either non-existent or are
to be considered mixed
conditions.
1 Nicoll, Testament, I, p. 592.
2 R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of St. Luke's Gospel
(Minneapolis:
Augsburg Publishing House, 1964), p. 867.
3 John Peter Lange, editor,
Commentary on the Holy Scriptures,
24
volumes reprinted in 12 (
1960), XI, p. 187.
110
Significance
of the Tense
The mood employed in the contrary to fact conditions is the
indicative. The only
variety comes in the tenses used, and these are
limited to the
augmented ones: imperfect, aorist and pluperfect.
The
Imperfect Tense
The basic significance of the imperfect tense is to
designate
durative or repeated
action in past time.1 This tense
may appear in both
parts of the
conditional sentence, or in either part in combination with
the other augmented
tenses.
Imperfect in Protasis
and Apodosis
When the imperfect is used in both the protasis and
apodosis,
it implies that the
condition and conclusion both involve durative acts.
The time of the
actions, though, is present, rather than past. Robertson
states this as a
general rule of these conditions: "An unfulfilled condi-
tion about the present
time was expressed in terms of the imperfect
must be determined from
the context: "The Imperfect denotes continued
action; the Aorist a
simple fact; the Pluperfect completed action.
The time is implied in
the context, not expressed by the verb."3 This
1 H. E. Dana and Julius R.
Mantey, A Manual Grammar of the Greek
New Testament (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1966), p. 186.
2 Robertson, Grammar, p. 1013.
3 Ernest DeWitt Burton, Syntax Moods and Tenses in New
Testament
Greek (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1897), p.
103.
111
is the more applicable
view, for even Robertson notes that in Hebrews
11:15 the imperfect is
used of continual action, but in past, not
present time.1 The equation of present time with the
imperfect tense,
while not an absolute
rule, does fit most of the examples in Appendix II.
Westcott summarizes:
In this case the hypothetic
unfulfilled [contrary to fact]
condition and the consequence of its
non-fulfillment are both
regarded (a) generally as present or (b),
if not as present, as
continuous and not definitely complete in
a specific incident.2
This combination is the most frequent (17 examples) type of
contrary to fact
conditions, and a glance at those listed will confirm
Westcott's
generalization. The actions viewed are considered continual
acts, and in the
present time in most cases. The list of examples
could be expanded at
the expense of the pluperfect, for this tense
can be treated as a
real imperfect. Both Westcott3 and Robertson4
recognize this. The
examples in Appendix II conform to verb structure,
not usage, so such
conditions are listed as pluperfects.
Imperfect in the
Protasis Only
Since the aorist tense is more frequent in the apodosis
than the
pluperfect (22 examples
as opposed to 9), the examples considered will
1 A. T. Robertson and W.
Hersey Davis, A New Short Grammar of the
Greek Testament (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1933), p. 352.
2 Brooke Foss Westcott, The Epistle to the Hebrews (
Macmillan
and Co., 1889), p. 112.
3 Ibid., p. 113.
4 Robertson, Grammar,
p. 1015.
112
be the imperfect-aorist
combination. Again, Westcott: "The hypothetic
unfulfilled [contrary
to fact] condition is regarded as continuous
and not definitely
complete in the past, while the consequence of its
non-fulfillment is
specific and past."1 The imperfect in the protasis
emphasizes continual or
durative action while the aorist in the apodosis
indicates a specific
action.
The New Testament has four examples of this
imperfect-aorist
combination, all of
them in John's Gospel: 11:21, 11:32, 14:28 and 18:30.
In 11:21 (ei] h#n w$de ou]k a@n a]pe<qanen o[
a]delfo<j mou) Martha's sorrowful
statement illustrates
these two ideas. The presence of Jesus, considered
in a durative way,
would have prevented the specific act of Lazarus'
death. In 14:28 (ei] h]gapa?te< me e]xa<rhte a@n)
the imperfect protasis
implies failure on the
part of the disciples to be loving Jesus as they